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INTRODUCTION

The cause of action for tortious breach of the implied cove
nant of good faith and fair dealing has traced a spectacular tra
jectory across the sky of California law, from its lift-off in
Comunale v. Traders & General Insurance CO. l in 1 95 9, to its
zenith in Seaman's Direct Buying Service v. Standard Oil CO.2 in
1 984, to the curtailment of tort remedies in Foley v. Interactive
Data Corp.3 in 1988 , and culminating in the reversal of Seaman's
in Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil CO.4 in 1 995. Throughout
this period, the potential for recovering punitive damages in con
tract cases fueled an epic struggle in the California courts to de
fine the nature and substance of the cause of action.
1. 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958).
2. 36 Cal. 3d 752, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 686 P.2d 1158 (Cal. 1984).
3. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
4. 11 Cal. 4th 85, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 420, 900 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1995). Freeman & Mills,
Inc. announced "a general rule precluding tort recovery for noninsurance contract
breach . ... " Id.at 102, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 430-31, 900 P.2d at 679-80. However,
"nothing in this opinion should be read as affecting the existing precedent governing
enforcement of the implied covenant in insurance cases." Id. at 103 , 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
431, 900 P.2d at 680.
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From the beginning, statutes of limitation have played an
important role in defining the parameters of a claim for breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.5 As a
result of this interaction between substance and procedure, how
ever, the case law regarding the statute of limitation for breach
of the implied covenant lies in considerable confusion. Several
different statutes of limitation have been considered by Califor
nia courts in an attempt to find the most appropriate limitation
period for the cause of action.6 In addition, the task of choosing
the proper statute of limitation has been complicated by the ef
forts of insurance companies and others to shorten the limitation
period by contractual modification.7
In this article, we first will review the general principles ap
plicable to classification of claims for limitation purposes and the
various statutes which could be applied to breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. We then will examine
cases in which the statute of limitation for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing was at issue and analyze
what limitation period, rules of accrual and tolling doctrines are
appropriate in the absence of contractual modification. Finally,
we will analyze the extent to which contractual modification of
the limitation period, rules of accrual and tolling doctrines has
been permitted, and analyze what limits, if any, should be placed
on such modifications.

5. See, e.g., Comunale v. 1raders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 662-63, 328 P.2d
198, 203 (Cal. 1958) (discussing election between tort and contract theories of liability
and effect on the statute of limitation).
6. See infra notes 29 -82 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 141-230 and accompanying text.
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CLASSIFICATION, ACCRUAL AND TOLLING IN THE
AB SENCE OF CONTRACTUAL MODIFICAT ION

A.

Classification

1. General Principles
The first step in answering any limitation question is to de
termine which statute applies to the particular claim at issue.s In
many cases, proper classification of the action is obvious, and the
selection of the appropriate statute can be made without diffi
culty. In other cases, courts may resort to the principle of statu
tory construction that the more specific statute should be applied
when there is a conflict with a statute of general application.9
However, when a claim does not clearly fall within a particular
statute, or when it appears to fall within more than one statute,
neither of which is more specific than the other, potential plain
tiffs can be misled, and a tremendous amount of time, money
and judicial resources can be spent fighting over the proper clas
sification of the cause of action for limitation purposes.
8. The statutes of limitation which apply to civil actions generally are contained in
Title II of the California Code of Civil Procedure. These statutes are divided into two
major categories: Actions for the Recovery of Real Property (Chapter II) and Actions
Other Than for the Recovery of Real Property (Chapter III). See CAL. CIY. PROC.
C ODE § 335 (West 1982). These limitation periods apply except "where. in special
cases, a different limitation is prescribed by statute." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 312
(West 1982). Statutes prescribing special limitation periods applicable to specific causes
of action are scattered throughout the California codes. See generally California Stat
utes of Limitation, 25 Sw. U. L. REV. 745 (1995).
9. "In the construction of a statute . . . when a general and particular provision are
inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former. " CAL. CIY. PROC. CODE § 1859
(West 1982). "This rule applies to statutes of limitations and consequently a specific
statute must take precedence over general statutes of limitation. " Comm. for a Pro
gressive Gilroy v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 192 Cal. App. 3d 847, 859, 237
Cal. Rptr. 723, 730 (Ct. App. 1987); accord, Loken v. Century 21-Award Properties, 36
Cal. App. 4th 263, 272-73, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 683, 689 (Ct. App. 1995); Krieger v. Nick
Alexander Imports, Inc., 234 Cal. App. 3d 205, 214, 285 Cal. Rptr. 717, 722 (Ct. App.
1991); Estate of Mason, 224 Cal. App. 3d 634, 638, 274 Cal. Rptr. 61, 64 (Ct. App. 1990).
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Unfortunately for practitioners, the Legislature has left little
or no evidence of its rationale in enacting the original classifica
tion scheme, and courts have not been able to discern any under
lying policy or set of policies by which such classification
problems can be solved. Indeed, the statutes purport to classify
actions on at least four different bases: the nature of the remedy
sought,lO the nature of the injury alleged,ll the identity or occu
pation of the defendant,12 and the grounds or legal theory upon
which the action is based.13
Given the apparent absence of a coherent rationale or set of
policies underlying the classification scheme, it is perhaps unsur
prising that the California courts have failed to develop a mean
ingful test to apply in deciding classification problems. In its
most recent pronouncement on the subject, the California
Supreme Court said:
To determine the statute of limitations which applies to a cause
of action it is necessary to identify the nature of the cause of
action, i.e., the "gravamen" of the cause of action. "[T]he nature
of the right sued upon and not the form of action nor the relief

10. Compare CAL. CIy. PROC. CODE § 318 (West 1982) (action for the recovery of
real property) and CAL. CIY. PROC. CODE § 338(a) (West Supp. 1996) (action upon a
liability created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture) with CAL. CIY. PROC.
CODE § 335 (West 1982) (actions other than for the recovery of real property) and CAL.
CIY. PROC. CODE § 340(1) (West Supp. 1996) (action upon a statute for a penalty or
forfeiture).
1 1. Compare CAL. CIy. PROC. CODE § 340(3) (West Supp. 1996) (actions for, inter
alia, injury or death caused by wrongful act or neglect of another) with CAL. ClY. PROC.
CODE § 339(1) (West Supp. 1996) (action upon any obligation or liability not founded
upon an instrument in writing).
12. See, e.g., CAL. ClY. PROC. CODE § 340.5 (West 1982) (action for injury or death
against a health care provider based upon professional negligence); CAL. ClY. PROC.
CODE § 340.6 (West 1982) (action against an attorney for a wrongful act or omission in
the performance of professional services).
13. See, e.g., CAL. ClY. PROC. CODE § 338(d) (West Supp. 1996) (action for relief
on the ground of fraud or mistake).
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demanded determines the applicability of the statute of limita
tions under our code.,, 1 4
One problem with this statement is that it is contradicted in
part by a legislative scheme that explicitly classifies some actions
on the basis of the relief sought.1s Thus, when read in context,
the quote appears to be nothing more than a restatement of the
familiar proposition that the label attached to the cause of action
in the pleading is not dispositive.1 6
More fundamentally, however, a test based upon "the na
ture of the right sued upon" or the "gravamen" of the cause of
action provides virtually no guidance beyond the specific case in
14. Hensler v. City of Glendale, 8 Cal. 4th I, 22-23, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244, 258, 876
P.2d 1043, 1057 (Cal. 1994) (citations omitted), (quoting Maguire v. Hibernia Sav. &
Loan Soc'y, 23 Cal. 2d 719, 733, 146 P.2d 673, 680 (Cal. 1944» . Accord, Jefferson v. J.E.
French Co., 54 Cal. 2d 717, 718, 7 Cal. Rptr. 899, 900, 355 P.2d 643, 644 (Cal. 1960); see
also Leeper v. Beltrami, 53 Cal. 2d 195, 214, 1 Cal. Rptr. 12, 25, 347 P.2d 12, 25 (Cal.
1959) ("the modem tendency is t9100k beyond the relief sought, and to view the matter
from the basic cause of action giving rise to the plaintiff's right to relief . . . . ").
"Gravamen" is defined as "[t]he material part of a grievance, charge, etc." Wil
liamson v. Pac. Greyhound Lines, 67 Cal. App. 2d 250, 252, 153 P.2d 990, 991 (Ct. App.
1944); see also id. at 253, 153 P.2d at 992 ("gravamen, or essential facts or grievance as
alleged"); BLACK'S LAW DlcrIONARY 701 (6th ed. 1990) ("[t]he material part of a griev
ance, complaint, indictment, charge, cause of action, etc. The burden or gist of a
charge; the grievance or injury specially complained of.") (citation omitted).
15. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., Hensler, 8 Cal. 4th at 26, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 260-61, 876 P.2d at 105960 ("The gravamen of plaintiffs cause of action is therefore a claim that the Glendale
ordinance is invalid on its face or as applied. . . . regardless of the title attached to the
cause of action or the remedy sought."); Hatch v. Collins, 225 Cal. App. 3d 1104, 11 10,
,
275 Cal. Rptr. 476, 479 (Ct. App. 1990) ("Although the Hatches label their complaint
'Breach of Fiduciary Duty. . . .' we must disregard those characterizations for purposes
of determining which limitations period applies."); Williamson, 67 Cal. App. 2d at 253,
153 P.2d at 991 ("the character of the action is to be determined by the nature of the
grievance rather than by the form of the pleadings.") (italics omitted) (citations omit
ted); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. McSweeney, 976 F.2d 532, 534 (9th Cir. 1992) ("To
determine which statutory period applies, California courts look to the substance or
gravamen of the complaint and the nature of the right sued upon rather than the cap
tion of the complaint or the relief sought."), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 950 (1993).
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which it is applied. In the absence of an underlying policy, how
is a court to determine "the nature of the right sued upon" ex
cept by assertion? In practice, California courts tend to deter
mine "the nature of the right sued upon" by analogyP This
method breaks down, however, when an analogy can plausibly
be drawn to more than one of the causes of action for which a
limitation period has expressly been provided.
One of the difficulties in selecting a statute of limitation for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is
that a number of plausible analogies to other causes of action
can be drawn. First, because the covenant is implied into a con
tractual relationship (which may or may not be in writing), it can
be argued that the cause of action is "[a]n action upon a con
tract, obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument of
writing," to which a two-year period applies.1s Second, the avail
ability of punitive damages for certain breaches of the implied
covenant19 supports the application of this statute on a different
theory, since the statute applies' to most commercial torts as well
as breaches of oral and implied contracts.20 Third, because the
17. See, e.g., Augusta v. United Servo Auto. Ass·n. 13 Cal. App. 4th 4.10. 16 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 400. 404 (Ct. App. 1993) (action for spoliation of evidence; holding "the situa
tion in the case at bar presents a direct analogy to the two-year rule applicable to ac
tions for interference with prospective economic advantage.").
18. CAL. CIY. PROC. CODE § 339(1) (West 1982). Cf Foley V. Interactive Data
Corp 47 Cal. 3d 654.690.254 Cal. Rptr. 211.232.765 P.2d 373.394 (Cal. 1988) ("An
allegation of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is an allega
tion of breach of an 'ex contractu' obligation. namely one arising out of the contract
itself.").
19. See, e.g., Egan V. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co 24 Cal. 3d 809.819-24. 169 Cal.
Rptr. 691 696-99.620 P.2d 141.146-49 (Cal. 197Q) (upholding jury's decision to award
punitive damages but reversing amount of punitive damages as excessive).
20. See, e.g., Eisenberg V. Insurance Co. of N. Am 815 F.2d 1285. 1292 (9th Cir.
1987) (Section 339(1) "was enacted as 'a catch-all for unusual tort actions not otherwise
..
provided for. ·) (citation omitted); cf. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1996) (puni
tive damages authorized "[i]n an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from
contract . . . . ") .
.•

.•

.•
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'
covenant is implied into written contracts as well as oral ones, -it
can be argued that where the underlying contract is in writing, an
action for breach of the implied covenant is "[a]n action upon
any contract, obligation or liability founded upon an instrument
in writing," to which a four-year period applies.21 Fourth, be
cause damages for emotional distress are available for certain
breaches of the covenant,22 it can be argued that such breaches
are actions "for injury to . . . one caused by the wrongful act or
neglect of another," to which a one-year limitation period ap
plies.23 Fifth, because "bad faith" implies an element of dishon
esty, it can be argued that an action for breach of the covenant is
"[a]n action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake, to
which a three-year limitation period applies. "24 Sixth, because
the cause of action most frequently arises in the insurance con
text, it can be argued that the one-year limitation period in the
California standard form fire-insurance policy2S should be ap
plied if such a provision is contained in the written contract,

21. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 337, subd. 1 (West 1982). See, e. g. , Comunale v. Trad
ers & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 662, 328 P.2d 198, 203 (Cal. 1958) (" The promise
which the law implies as an element of the contract is as much a part of the [written]
instrument as if it were written out.").
22. See Crisci v. Security Ins. Co. of New Haven, 66 Cal. 2d 425, 432-34, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 13, 18-19, 426 P.2d 173, 178-79 (Cal. 1967) (affirming award of damages for
mental suffering for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
23 . CAL. CIv. PROC. CoDE § 34O(3) (West Supp. 1996). Cf Cantu v. Resolution
Trust Corp., 4 Cal. App. 4th 857, 889, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 151, 170 (Ct. App. 1992) ("Be 
cause intentional infliction of emotional distress is an injury to the person, the applica
ble statute of limitations is one year.").
24. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338{d) (West Supp. 1996); cf. Crisci, 66 Cal. 2d at 43 0,
58 Cal. Rptr. at 16, 426 P.2d at 176 ("Several cases, in considering the liability of the
insurer, contain language to the effect that bad faith is the equivalent of dishonesty,
fraud, and concealment.").
25. CAL. INS. CODE § 2071 (West 1993) ("No suit or action on this policy for the
recovery of any claim shall be sustainable in any court of law or equity unless . . .
commenced within 12 months next after inception of the loss.").
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either by statutory mandate (for fire-insurance policies)26 or by
agreement of the contracting parties.27 Seventh, it can be argued
that the cause of action for breach of the implied covenant is
simply "[a]n action for relief not hereinbefore provided for," to
which a four-year period applies.28 Faced with so many plausbile
choices, it is not surprising that courts sometimes reached incon
sistent results.

2. Case Law Prior to 1 986: Election of Remedies
In the seminal case of Comunale v. Traders & ' General In
surance CO.,29 the California Supreme Court held that an action
could be maintained against an insurer "who refuses to accept a
reasonable settlement within the policy limits in violation of its
duty to consider in good faith the interest of the insured in the
settlement. "3 0 The court then went on to consider whether the
newly-recognized cause of action was barred by the statute of
limitation. The court noted that the complaint had been filed
"less than four years but more than two years after the cause of
action arose."31 Accordingly, the insurer argued that "an action
on an implied obligation arising out of contract is not on the
26. CAL. INS. CoDE § 2 070 (West 1993) ("All fire policies on subject matter in Cali
fornia shall be on the standard fo nn . . . . ") ; see Prieto v. State Fa nn Fire & Cas. Co. , 225
Cal. App. 3d 1188, 1195 , 275 Cal. Rptr. 362, 365-66 (Ct. App. 1990) ("[W]e find neither
reason nor authority to signify that a plaintiff's election to seek redress under the im
plied covenant . . . should nullify the legislatively prescribed limitation . . . . ")
27. See, e.g., Frazier v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 169 Cal. App. 3d 90, 1 03 , 214
Cal. Rptr. 883, 890 (Ct. App. 1985) ("Metropolitan urges that if Mrs. Frazier is pe nnit
ted to proceed upon a contractual theory , she is then bound by the time limitations
contained in the insurance policy itself . . . . ").
28. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 344 (West 1982).
29. 5 0 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958).
3 0. ld. at 661 , 328 P.2d at 202. See also id. at 659, 328 P.2d at 201 (the insurer's
"unwarranted refusal [to settle] . . . constitutes a breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.").
31. ld. at 662 , 328 P.2d at 2 03.
.
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written instrument,"32 and therefore that the two-year limitation
period of section 339(1) applied, rather than the four-year limita
tion period of section 337(1). The court rejected this argument,
stating:
The promise which the law implies as an element of the contract
is as much a part of the instrument as if it were written out. [Ci
tations omitted]. lraders relies on a statement in Scrivner v.
Woodward, 139 Cal. 314, 316, 73 P. 863 [(Cal. 1903)], that
'Promises merely implied by law, and not supported by any ex
press promise or stipulation in the written instrument, do not fall
within the provision of section 337, relating to contracts in writ
ing.' This statement is too broad, and it was limited in O'Brien v.
King, 174 Cal. 769,774,164 P. 631 [(Cal. 1917)],as applying only
to a quasi contractual liability. 33
The court's holding on this point is supported by the language of
section 337(1), which reads (in relevant part): "[a]n action upon
any contract, obligation or liability founded upon an instrument
in writing."3 4 This language appears to encompass an implied
"obligation or liability" so long as it is "founded upon an instru
ment in writing."
Had the court ended the opinion there, it would have been
clear that a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing was a contractual action, and that the
limitation period to be applied depended only on whether the
underlying contract was or was not in writing. However, the
court went on to state: "Although a wrongful refusal to settle
has generally been treated as a tort, it is the rule that where a
case sounds both in contract and tort the plaintiff will ordinarily

32. Id.
33. Id.
34. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 337(1} (West 1982).
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have freedom of election between an action of tort and one of
contract. "35 .
This comment sowed the seeds of confusion over the nature
of the cause of action for decades to come.36 Certainly it pro
vided a hook on which the California Supreme Court could hang
its subsequent decisions recognizing the availability of tort reme
dies, including punitive damages, for breach of the implied cove
nant of good faith and fair dealing.37 And it was the availability
of tort remedies that led to proliferation in the number of claims
and to efforts to extend the doctrine to contracts outside the in
surance context.38 The availability of tort remedies also lent ad
ded urgency to the efforts of defendants to try to defeat such
claims by means of the statute of limitation.
The implications of the dual nature of the cause of action
for the statute of limitation was first confronted by a federal
35. Id. at 663, 328 P.2d at 203 (citations omitted). See also id. at 661 , 328 P.2d at
202 (action is assignable "whether the action is considered as sounding in tort or in
contract. ").
36. See, e.g., Frazier v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 169 Cal. App. 3d 90, 100, 214
Cal. Rptr. 883,888 (Ct. App. 1985) ("The question whether an action . . . for breach of
[the] implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing . . . sounds in tort or in contract is
difficult to analyze in clear logical terms. In the words of the trial court 'it seems to me
that the Courts have created a hybrid. . . . ).
37. See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co. of New Haven, 66 Cal. 2d 425,432, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 13,18,426 P.2d 173, 178 (Cal. 1967) (holding that "an action of the type involved
here sounds in both contract and tort" and approving recovery of damages for mental
suffering); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 578-80, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 48890, 510 P.2d 1032, 1040-42 (Cal. 1973) (approving recovery of damages for emotional
distress); Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 819-24, 169 Cal. Rptr. 691,
696-99, 620 P.2d 141, 146-49 (Cal. 1979) (upholding jury's decision to award punitive
damages but reversing amount of punitive damages as excessive).
38. See, e.g., Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752,
206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 686 P.2d 1158 (Cal. 1984) (recognizing tort action for bad faith de
nial of the existence of a contract and suggesting that breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in employment or commercial contracts might also give rise to an
action in tort), overruled by, Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 11 Cal. 4th 85, 44
Cal. Rptr. 2d 420, 900 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1995).
"'
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court. In McDowell v. Union Mutual Life Insurance CO.,39 the
insureds sued two insurance companies for, inter alia, bad faith
refusal to pay benefits due under group medical insurance poli
cies, and sought to recover damages for emotional distress and
punitive damages. 4o The insurer argued that Code of Civil Pro
cedure section 340(3), the one-year statute of limitation for per
sonal injury, "embraces any wrongful act resulting in personal
injury whether that act be a contractual breach or the violation
of a tort duty" and should be applied to the bad-faith claims. 41
The district court rejected this argument for two reasons. First, it
relied on dicta in Comunale which indicated that the bad-faith
cause of action was one "which relaters] to financial damage . . .
[rather than one] for personal injury caused by negligence,
where the tort character of the action is considered to prevail
. . . . " 42 Second, it noted that the California Supreme Court had
permitted recovery of damages for emotional distress while
reemphasizing the dual nature of the cause of action. 43 The
court concluded:
Since the bad faith cause of action sounds in both contract and
tort . .. this court cannot say that the tort character of the action
predominates.. The defendants' § 340(3) argument is rejected.
Plaintiffs can properly found their bad faith contract claim on
§ 337(1) and its four year statute of limitation provision.44
39. 404 F. Supp. 136 (C. D. Cal. 1975).
4 0. Id. at 138-39.
41. Id. at 143.
42. Id. at 144-45 (quoting Comunale v. 1raders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 663,
328 P.2d 198, 2 02 (Cal. 1958)).
43. Id. at 145 (citing Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 432, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13,
18, 426 P.2d 173, 178 (Cal. 1967) (bad faith cause of action "sounds in both contract and
tort")); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 573 , 1 08 Cal. Rptr . 480, 484, 5 1 0
P.2d 1 032, 1 036 (Cal. 1973); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
9 Cal. App. 3d 5 08, 527, 88 Cal. Rptr. 246, 258 (Ct. App. 1970) (award for pain and
distress "was proper even under a breach of contract theory. ").
44. McDowell v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 404 F. Supp. 136, 145 (C. D. Cal. 1975).
However, the court did apply the one-year limitation period to the insured's separately
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The court went on to hold, however, that if the insureds elected
to sue in contract, they could not maintain a claim for punitive
damages, noting that "the courts in California do not uphold
awards for punitive damages in contract actions." 45 On the other
hand, if the insureds elected to bring their bad faith cause of
action in tort rather than in contract, in order to preserve their
punitive damage claim, then a different statute of limitation
would apply. 46 The court explained, "[t]he gravamen of the bad
faith cause of action in tort is the tortious interference with an
intangible property interest," 47 and such a claim "is to be con
trolled by the two year statute of limitations covering actions
upon 'a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon an in
strument in writing. "' 48 The court acknowledged that Comunale
had held that the four-year statute of limitation applied, and that
there was a "respectable argument" that the four-year period
should apply even when punitive damages were sought:
[I]t would seem natural to conclude that the tortious bad faith
cause of action is based upon an obligation founded upon a writ
ten instrument and that a section dealing with obligations not
founded upon a written instrument has no bearing. Moreover
such a reconciliation of the sections would seem to comport with
their underlying philosophy which appears to be that if there is a
writing in permanent form evidencing the existence of an agree-

pleaded claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 147-48; accord,
Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 83 Cal . App. 3d 38, 5 0, 147 Cal. Rptr. 565, 575 (a. App.
1978).
45 . McDowell , 404 F. Supp. at 145 (citing for support Crogan v. Metz, 47 Ca l. 2d
398, 4 05, 3 03 P.2d 1 029, 1 033 (Cal. 1956) }.
46. Id. at 145-46 & n.7.
47. Id. at 146 (citing for support Mustachio v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., 44 Cal. App.
3d 358, 363, 118 Cal . Rptr. 581, 584 (Ct. App . 1975) }.
48. Id. at 146 ( quoting CAL. CIv. PROC. CoDE § 339(1) (West 1982) }; see e.g., TU
VU Drive-In Corp. v . Davies, 66 Cal. 2d 435, 437, 58 Cal . Rptr. 105, 106, 426 P.2d 5 05,
5 06 (Cal. 1 967).

HeinOnline -- 26 Sw. U. L. Rev. 13 1996-1997

14

SOUTHWESTERN UNWERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

ment and the terms and obligations thereof, it is appropriate that
a longer statute of limitations apply.49
On the other hand, the court also noted that Comunale had dis
tinguished cases "where the tort character of the action is consid
ered to prevail,"50 and that other cases had applied the two-year
period to tort actions, even though the duty was founded upon a
written contract.5 l Consequently, since the action in McDowell
was filed more than two years, but less than four years, after the
alleged wrongful refusal to pay, the court granted the insurer's
motion to dismiss or strike the claim for punitive damages.52
Subsequent California cases have confirmed both aspects of
the McDowell opinion. In Richardson v. Allstate Insurance
Co. ,53 the California Court of Appeal rejected the argument that
the one-year personal-injury statute of limitation applied to a
bad-faith action alleging damages for emotional distress:
The error in Allstate's reasoning is the assumption that a tort
action against an insurer for bad faith is based upon an alleged
interference with a personal right merely because mental distress
is alleged. Breach of the implied covenant of good faith is action
able because such conduct causes financial loss to the insured,
and it is the financial loss or risk of financial loss which defines
the cause of action. Mental distress is compensable as an aggra
vation of the financial damages, not as a separate cause of
action.54
49. [d. at 147.
5 0. See Comu nale v. 1i'aders & Ge n. Ins. Co., 5 0 Cal . 2d 654, 663, 328 P.2d 203
(Cal. 1958).
51. McDowell, 404 F. Supp. at 147 (citi ng L.B. Lab., Inc. v. Mitchell, 39 Cal. 2d 56,
63, 244 P.2d 385, 389 (Cal. 1952) (accounta nt malpractice) ; Benard v. Walkup, 272 Cal.
App. 2d 595, 600, 77 Cal. Rptr. 544, 547 (Ct. App. 1969) (legal malpractice) }. The Leg
islature has si nce e nacted a speci fic statute of li mitatio n for legal malpractice actions.
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.6 (West 1982).
52. 404 F. Supp. at 147.
53. 1 17 Cal. App. 3d 8, 172 Cal. Rptr. 423 (Ct. App. 1981).
54. [d. at 13, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 426. The same conclusio n was also reached in Eise n
berg v. Insura nce Co. of N. Am. 815 F.2d 1285, 1291-92 (9th Cir. 1987), a case i nvolvi ng
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Having decided that the action was timely filed as a tort action
under the two-year statute, Richardson declined to decide
whether it could also be brought under the four;.year statute.55
In Frazier v. Metropolitan Life Insurance CO.,56 however, the
court of appeal confirmed that the plaintiff "is at liberty to make
an election" between an action in contract and an action in
tort.57
an alleged tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an employ
ment contract. In Eisenberg, the employer cited Newfield v. Ins. Co. of the West, 156
Cal. App. 3d 440, 203 Cal. Rptr. 9 (Ct. App. 1984), for the proposition that the one-year
statute of limitation should apply. In Newfield, the court held that plaintiff had not
stated a cause of action for wrongful discharge founded upon violation of public policy
or a statute, 156 Cal. App. 3d at 443-44, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 11, and further held that "any
tort action would be barred by the one-year statute of limitations." Id. at 443, 203 Cal.
Rptr. at 10. The Newfield court cited no authority, and Eisenberg correctly noted that
"[t]his proposition is not embraced by the majority of California courts." 815 F.2d at
1291 n.7. The Eisenberg court also noted that Newfield was followed on this point in
Miller v. Indasco, Inc., 223 Cal. Rptr. 551 (Ct. App. 1986), review granted, 227 Cal. Rptr.
390, 719 P.2d 986 (Cal. 1986); transferred with directions to vacate and reconsider, 264
Cal. Rptr. 353, 782 P.2d 594 (Cal. 1989). See Eisenberg, 815 F.2d at 1291. In so doing,
the Eisenberg court apparently overlooked the. fact that when review was granted,
Miller was deprived of its precedential effect under California law. See CAL. R. Cr.
976(d) (West Supp. 1996) ("Unless otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court, no opin
ion superseded by grant of review, rehearing or other action shall be published.") See
also CAL. R. Cr. 977(a) (West Supp. 1996) ("An opinion that is not ordered published
shaH not be cited or relied on by a court or a party in any other action or proceeding
except as [otherwise] provided . . . . ").
Having rejected the one-year statute, Eisenberg held that the two-year period of
CAL. CIV. PROC. CoDE § 339(1) applied to a tort action for breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. Eisenberg, 815 F.2d at 1292. Eisenberg was subsequently
overruled on this point by Harrell v. 20th Century Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 203 (9th Cir. 1991).
See infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
55. Richardson, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 14, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 427.
56. 169 Cal. App. 3d 90, 214 Cal. Rptr. 883 (Ct. App. 1985).
57. Id. at 101, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 889. The court of appeal also held that·plaintiff had
not made an irrevocable election to sue in tort by checking the "tort" box in the certifi
cate of assignment. Instead, it held "[a] person should be entitled to change his alterna
tive remedies until one of his inconsistent rights is vindicated by satisfaction of
judgment or by application of the doctrines of res judicata or estoppel." Id.
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[Ilf [the plaintiff] chooses to proceed on a contract theory she is
entitled to the four-year statute of limitations permitted by Code
of Civil Procedure section 337, subdivision (1) , when suing upon
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and for
damages for emotional distress based upon such breach.58
The court also adopted McDowell's holding that the two-year
limitation period applied if the plaintiff elected to proceed on a
tort theory,59 emphasizing that "if the tort cause of action is
time-barred . . . plaintiff must proceed solely on her contract the
ory; and she may not also proceed on the time-barred tort theory
to obtain punitive damages. "60 Although the court recognized
the inconsistency of permitting damages for emotional distress
but barring punitive damages, it explained that "[w]e fail to find
any California case allowing punitive damages when the com
plaint is based only on a contract theory of action,"61 and con
cluded that "pure logic must give way to the strict statutory
prohibition of [Civil Code] section 32 94 and case authority inter
preting the statute . . . . "62
Thus, by 1986 it was relatively clear that plaintiff could
make an election between contract and tort when suing for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
and that if a contract theory was chosen, the four-year statute
would apply if the underlying contract was in writing; but if a
tort theory was chosen (in order to provide the basis for punitive
58. [d. at 102, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 889.
59. [d. at 105-06, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 892.
60. [d. at 107, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 892. The court also held that the action was not
barred by the two-years-and-ninety-days limitation contained in the insurance policy
itself. [d. at 103-04, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 890-91. This aspect of the decision is discussed in
Part II below. See infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
61. [d. at 106, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 892 (italics in original).
62. [d. at 107,214 Cal. Rptr. at 893. That section provides that punitive damages
may be awarded "[i]n an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from con
tract." CAL. Crv. CODE § 3294(a) (West Supp. 1996).
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damages), the two-year statute would apply. Unfortunately, this
apparent stability turned out to be transitory.

3.

Case Law After 1 986: Changing the Nature of the
Implied Covenant

On November 4, 1 986, three justices of the California
Supreme Court were defeated in a recall election,63 and they
were soon replaced by three justices appointed by then-Gover
nor George A. Deukmejian.64 Overnight, the ideological com
position of the court shifted from dominance by a liberal
majority, which had consistently expanded the cause of action
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
to dominance by a conservative majority, which was widely per
ceived to be more pro-business and less pro-consumer.65 Within
its first full term, the new maj ority immediately set about limit
ing the scope of the cause of action for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
In Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.,66 the California Supreme
Court held that "tort remedies are not available for breach of
the implied covenant [of good faith and fair dealing] in an em
ployment contract to employees who allege they have been dis
charged in violation of the covenant. "67 Although the court
63. See Frank Clifford, Voters Repudiate Three of Court's Liberal Justices, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 5, 1986, at F8. The defeated justices were Chief Justice Rose Elizabeth
Bird, and Associate Justices Joseph R. Grodin and Cruz Reynoso. Id.
64. See Philip Hagar, Three New Justices of State High Court Sworn In, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 19, 1987, at 1. The three new Associate Justices were John A. Arguelles, David N.
Eagleson and Marcus M. Kaufman. Id. Former Associate Justice Malcom M. Lucas
had previously been elevated to Chief Justice by Governor Deukmejian. Id. at 30.
65. See, e.g., Philip Hagar, Dropped Cases Indicate Shift to Right by Court, L.A.
TIMES, May 26, 1987, at F3.
66. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
67. Id. at 700, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40, 765 P.2d at 401; see also id. at 696, 254 Cal.
Rptr. at 236-37, 765 P.2d at 398 ("[T]he employment relationship is fundamentally con
tractual, and several factors combine to persuade us that in the absence of legislative
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purported only to decide the question with respect to employ
ment contracts, its broad language left little doubt that it in
tended its holding to apply to all contracts except insurance
policies, where the tort cause of action was already well
established:
An allegation of breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing is an allegation of breach of an "ex contractu"
obligation, namely one arising out of the contract itself. The cov
enant of good faith is read into contracts in order to protect the
express covenants or promises of the contract, not to protect
some general public policy interest not directly tied to the COD
tract's purposes. The insurance cases thus were a major depar
ture from traditional principles of contract law. We must,
therefore, consider with great care claims that extension of the
exceptional approach taken in those cases is automatically appro
priate if certain hallmarks and similarities can be adduced in an
other contract setting.68
In the wake of Foley, two opinions have recognized that the
California Supreme Court's renewed emphasis on the contrac
tual nature of the cause of action has implications for the selec
tion of the proper statute of limitation to be applied. In Krieger
v. Nick Alexander Imports, Inc. ,69 the California Court of Appeal
cited Foley and Frazier in holding that the plaintiff could elect to
proceed on a contract theory in pursuing its third cause of action,
labeled "Tortious Bad Faith Breach of the Covenant of Good
Faith," and that therefore the proper limitation period was the
direction to the contrary[,j contractual remedies should remain the sole available relief
for breaches of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment
context. )
68. ld. at 690, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 232, 765 P.2d at 394; see also td. at 683, 254 Cal.
Rptr. at 227, 765 P.2d at 389 ("The covenant of good faith and fair dealing was devel
oped in the contract arena and is aimed at making effective the agreement's
promises."); id. at 684, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 227, 765 P.2d at 389 ("Because the covenant is a
contract term, however, compensation for its breach has almost always been limited to
contract rather than tort remedies.").
69. 234 Cal. App. 3d 205, 285 Cal. Rptr. 717 (Ct. App. 1991).
If

.
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four-year period of section 337(1). 0' Likewise, in Harrell v. 20th
Century Insurance CO.,71 the Ninth Circuit held that Foley had
the effect of superseding the Ninth Circuit's previous holding in
Eisenberg v. Insurance Co. of North America72 that "the Califor
nia Supreme Court would most likely adopt section 339(1)'s two
year limitations period to a claim for breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing."73 Since Harrell involved "a dispute
arising from an alleged breach of a standard commercial contract
for the sale of a business,"74 the court held that "the Harrell's
claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing presents a contract claim subject to the four-year statute
of limitation applicable to written contracts set forth in Califor
nia Code of Civil Procedure § 337(1)."75
More recently, in Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil CO.,76
the California Supreme Court overruled Seaman's Direct Buying
Service v. Standard Oil CO.,77 a 1984 California Supreme Court
decision which had recognized a cause of action in tort for bad
faith denial of the existence of a contract,78 Seaman's had sug
gested that tort remedies might be available for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in contexts other
than insurance, including employment and commercial con70. ld. at 220-21,285 Cal. Rptr. at 726-27.
71. 934 F.2d 203 (9th Cir. 1991).
72. 815 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1987).
73. Harrell, 934 F.2d at 207 (citing Eisenberg, 815 F.2d at 1291-92).
74. Harrell, 934 F.2d at 208.
75. ld. In light of its reliance on more recent California authority, Harrell should
also be deemed to overrule other federal cases in which the two-year limitation period
was applied to actions for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
in a non-insurance context. See, e.g., Eichman v. Fotomat Corp.,871 F.2d 784,793 (9th
Cir. 1989); Crossen v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1076, 1079 (N.D. Cal.
1982).
76. 11 Cal. 4th 85,44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 420, 900 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1995).
77. 36 Cal. 3d 752,206 Cal. Rptr. 354,686 P.2d 1 158 (Cal. 1984).
78. ld. at 769,206 Cal. Rptr. at 363,686 P.2d at 1167.
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tracts.19 Moreover, lest its message remain unclear, the Freeman
court announced "a general rule precluding tort recovery for
noninsurance contract breach, at least in the absence of violation
of 'an independent duty arising from principles of tort law' other
than the bad faith denial of the existence of, or liability under,
the breached contract. "80
Thus, in light of the California Supreme Court's return to
the contractual principles underlying the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, it is now clear that the case law per
mitting an "election of remedies" for breach of the implied cove
nant, and the consequent election of the statute of limitation to
be applied, no longer has any application outside the insurance
context.81 Instead, the limitation period to be applied is either
the four-year period, if the underlying contract is in writing, or
the two-year period, if the underlying contract is oral or
implied.82
79. [d. at 768-69 & n.6, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362-6 3 & n.6, 686 P.2d at 1166-6 7 & n.6.
80. Freeman, 11 Cal. 4th at 102, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 430-31, 900 P.2d at 6 79-80
(citations omitted). The holding in Freeman obviously also has the effect of eliminating
the need to determine which statute of limitation applies to the cause of action for bad
faith denial of the existence of a contract. Cf Smyth v. USAA Property & Cas. Ins.
Co., 5 Cal. App. 4th 1470, 14 76-77, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 694, 697-98 (Ct. App. 1992) (applying
two-year statute).
81. Cf Love v. Fire Ins. Exch., 221 Cal. App. 3d 1136, 1144 n.4, 2 71 Cal. R ptr. 246,
249 n.4 (Ct. App. 1990) (four-year statute of limitation applies to plaintiffs ' "claim for
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing insofar as it rests on the im plied
contractual promise," but two-year statute applies "[t]o the extent the Loves seek tort
remedies on their claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.").
Moreover, in the insurance context, the issue of whether the plaintiff may choose the
statute of limitation by means of an election of remedies has been almost entirely super
seded by the insurers ' attem pts to modify the applicable limitation period by contract.
This issue is discussed infra Part III.
82. Of course, in accordance with CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 312, this general rule
will not apply in contractual contexts where "a different limitation period is prescribed
by statute." CAL. CN. PROC. CoDE § 312 (West 1982) . See, e.g., Loehr v. Ventura
Community College Dist., 147 Cal. App. 3d 1071, 1079, 195 Cal. Rptr. 5 76, 581 (Ct.
App. 1983) (one-year period of California Tort Claims Act applies to claims seeking

HeinOnline -- 26 Sw. U. L. Rev. 20 1996-1997

1996]
B.

UNRAVELING THE TANGLED WEB

21

Accrual and Tolling

1. General Principles
Section 312 of the California Code of Civil Procedure pro
vides: "[c]ivil actions . . . can only be commenced within the
periods prescribed in this title, after the cause of action shall have
accrued . . . . "83 Once the proper period has been selected, the
next step is to determine when the cause of action accrues.84
It has been stated that "[i]n ordinary tort and contract ac
tions, the statute of limitations . . . begins to run upon the occur
rence of the last essential element to the cause of action. "85 This
statement, however, is a circular truism: it merely states that a
person is not required to sue (and cannot be precluded from do
ing so) until he or she is able to do so. In the absence of legisla
tive guidance,86 the courts have created three major rules of
damages against governmental entities "whether [the underlying action] sound[s] in tort
or contract."); Ficalora v. Lockheed Corp.,193 Cal. App. 3d 489,238 Cal. Rptr. 360 (Ct.
App. 1987) (action for violation of Fair Employment and Housing Act subject to one
year limitation pe riod provided in Act; common law causes of action preempted).
83. CAL. ClY. PROC. CODE § 312 (West 1982) (emphasis added).
84. Section 312 "does not define that point at which the cause of action accrues."
Neel v. Magana,Olney,Levy,Cathcart & Gelfand,6 Cal. 3d 176,191 n.30,98 Cal. Rptr.
837, 846 n.30, 491 P.2d 421, 430 n.30 (Cal. 1971). Moreover, "[t]he Legislature has
enacted no statute which describes for each class of civil action,the date of accrual." Id.
at 191, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 846, 491 P.2d at 430. Thus,when the statute does not specify
when the cause of action accrues,"the Legislature has chosen to defer to judicial expe
rience and to repose with the judiciary the rendition of rules for the accrual of causes of
action." Id. at 192,98 Cal. Rptr. at 847, 491 P.2d at 431.
85. Neel, 6 Cal. 3d at 187,98 Cal. Rptr. at 844, 491 P.2d at 428.
86. California's first statute of limitation, enacted in 1850, specified the time of
accrual for only one type of civil action: "[a]n action for relief on the ground of fraud,"
was "not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party,of
the facts constituting the fraud." Act of April 22,1850,ch. 127,§ 17(4),1850 Cal. Stat.
343, 345 (commencement of civil action); cf CAL. avo PROC. CODE § 338(d) (West
Supp. 1996) (action for relief on the grounds of fraud or mistake). Since 1970,however,
most newly-enacted statutes of limitation specify the time of accrual in addition to the
period of limitation. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.5 (West 1982) (medical
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accrual, whose applicability depends in part on the substantive
law applicable to the cause of action: the "wrongful act" rule,
the "damage" rule, and the "discovery" rule.
Under the "wrongful act" rule, "a cause of action arises
when the wrongful act was committed and not at the time of the
discovery; the statute commences to run even though a plaintiff
is ignorant that he has a cause of action. "87 This rule is most
frequently applied in contract cases, where it is held that a cause
of action for breach of contract accrues, and the statute of limita
tion begins to run, at the time the breach occurs.88
The "wrongful act" rule is consistent with the notion that a
cause of action for breach of contract may be maintained even
though the plaintiff suffered only nominal damages.89 Some
times, however, the "wrongful act" rule of accrual can result in a
cause of action being barred before the injured party suffered
any appreciable damage. For example, if a plaintiff is exposed to
a toxic substance, such as asbestos, that exposure may not result
in cancer or other injury for many years. Thus, in tort ca�es,
courts came to hold that "damage" is an essential element of the

malpractice); CAL. CIV. PROC. CoDE § 340.6 (West 1982) (legal malpractice); CAL. CIV.
PROC. CoDE § 340.2 (West 1982) (exposure to asbestos).
87. Myers v. Eastwood Care Ctr., Inc., 31 Cal. 3d 628, 634, 183 Cal. Rptr. 386, 389·
90, 645 P.2d 1218, 1221 (Cal. 1982).
88. See Spear v. Cal. State Auto. Ass'n, 2 Cal. 4th 1035, 1042, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 381,
385, 831 P.2d 821, 825 (Cal. 1992) ("A contract cause of action does not accrue until the
contract has been breached."); Krieger v. Nick Alexander Imports, Inc., 234 Cal. App.
3d 205, 221, 285 Cal. Rptr. 717, 727 (Ct. App. 1991) ("In contract actions, the cause of
action generally accrues at the time of the breach."); cf CAL. COM. CoDE § 2725(2)
(West Supp. 1996) ("A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of
the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach.").
89. See, e.g., Xebec Dev. Partners, Ltd. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 12 Cal.
App. 4th 501, 576, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 726, 769 (Ct. App. 1993) ("if no injury were proved
XDP . . . would in any event be entitled to nominal damages for breach of the insurance
contract. ").
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cause of action, without which the plaintiff cannot sue.90 The
practical consequence of this view is that "the statute of limita
tion does not begin to run against a negligence action until some
damage has occurred. "91
Even under the "damage" rule of accrual, however, a cause
of action may become barred by the statute of limitations before
the plaintiff discovers, or should have discovered, a causal con
nection between the alleged wrongful act and the injury. This
can occur, for example, in toxic tort cases, where the plaintiff
may suffer a disease or disability, but may not be aware that it
was caused by exposure to a toxic substance until a much later
date. Thus, courts developed a third rule of accrual, the "discov
ery" rule, under which "the accrual date of a cause of action is
90. "Unlike a contract action where the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment and nom
inal damages without proof of actual damages, a negligence action may not be main
tained in the absence of proof of actual, proximately caused damages." Garton v. Title
Ins. & 1hJst Co., 106 Cal. App. 3d 365, 381, 165 Cal. Rptr. 449, 458 (Ct. App. 1980); see
also Budd v. Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d 195, 200, 98 Cal. Rptr. 849, 852, 491 P.2d 433, 436 (Cal.
1971) ("If the allegedly negligent conduct does not cause damage, it generates no cause
of action in tort. ").

91. Budd, 6 Cal. 3d at 200, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 852, 491 P.2d at 436; see also Davies v.
Krasna, 14 Cal. 3d 502, 513, 121 Cal. Rptr. 705, 712, 535 P.2d 1161, 1168 (Cal. 1975)
(tort action for breach of confidence) (citations omitted):
[W)e have drifted away from the view held by some that the limitations period
necessarily begins when an act or omission of defendant constitutes a legal wrong as
a matter of substantive law. Rather, we subscribe to the view that the period cannot
run before plaintiff possesses a true cause of action, by which we mean that events
have developed to a point where the plaintiff is entitled to a legal remedy, not
merely a symbolic judgment such as an award of nominal damages.
Accord, Miller v. Bean, 87 Cal. App. 2d 186, 189, 196 P.2d 596, 598 (Ct. App. 1948)

(action for breach of written covenant to protect title to property subject to deed of
trust).
The same result is achieved regardless of whether the "damage" rule is considered
to be a rule of accrual or a tolling doctrine. Compare Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 44 Cal. 3d
1103, 1 109, 245 Cal. Rptr. 658, 661, 751 P.2d 923, 926 (Cal. 1988) (describing "the com
mon law rule, that an action accrues on the date of injury") with CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 34O.6(a)(1) (West 1982) (action for legal malpractice is "tolled during the time that . . .
[t]he plaintiff has not sustained actual injury.").
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delayed until the plaintiff is aware of her injury and its negligent
cause."92 The standard is one of inquiry notice: "Under the dis
covery rule, the statute of limitations begins to run when the
plaintiff suspects or should suspect that her injury was caused by
wrongdoing, that someone has done something wrong to her."93

2.

Insurance Contracts

Given the California Supreme Court's renewed emphasis on
the contractual nature of the cause of action for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,94 one might as
sume that the "wrongful act" rule should be applied, and that the
cause of action should be deemed to accrue at the time the
breach occurs. In most cases involving breach of contract, how
ever, application of the "wrongful act" rule is consistent with the
discovery rule, because the plaintiff "is easily aware that the con
tract has been breached."95 On the other hand, where the plain
tiff is justifiably unaware of the breach, courts have applied the
discovery rule, even in a contract cases.96 Thus, although case
law continues to maintain that the discovery rule is an exception

92. Jolly, 44 Cal. 3d at 1109, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 661, 751 P.2d at 926-27.
93. Id. at 1110, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 662, 751 P.2d at 927.
94. See infra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
95. April Enter., Inc. v. KTIV, 147 Cal. App. 3d 805, 831, 195 Cal. Rptr. 421, 436
(Ct. App. 1983).
96. See, e.g., id. at 832, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 437 ("we hold the discovery rule may be
applied to breaches [of contract] which can be, and are, committed in secret and, more
over, where the harm flowing from those breaches will not be reasonably discoverable
by plaintiffs until a future time."); accord, Lee v. Escrow Consultants, Inc., 210 Cal.
App. 3d 915, 923 n.5, 259 Cal. Rptr. 117, 122 n.5 (Ct. App. 1989); Evans v. Eckelman,
216 Cal. App. 3d 1609, 1614, 265 Cal. Rptr. 605, 607 (Ct. App. 1990) (dictum); cf. CAL.
COM. CODE § 2725(2) (West Supp. 1995) ("where a warranty explicitly extends to fu
ture performance . . . and discovery of the breach must await the time of such perform
ance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.").
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to the traditional rules of accrual in contract and tort cases,97 a
realistic assessment of the law of accrual as it is currently applied
leads to the conclusion that the discovery rule is now the general
rule of accrual for civil actions in California.98
In insurance cases, breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing usually occurs in one of three ways: wrong
ful refusal to pay benefits due under the policy; wrongful refusal
to defend the insured against claims made against him or her
under a liability insurance policy; or wrongful refusal to settle a
claim against the insured under a liability insurance policy. Each
of these will be discussed in tum.
In a case of wrongful refusal to pay benefits, the breach
could be deemed to occur when the contingent event giving rise
to the contractual liability occurs.99 Thus, for example, for fail
ure to pay benefits due under a life insurance policy, the breach
could be deemed to occur when the insured dies. The insured's
right to receive payment, however, does not necessarily mature
upon occurrence of the conditional event; typically, the insured
97. See, e.g., Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 187,
98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 844, 491 P.2d 421, 428 (Cal. 1971) (contrasting "ordinary tort and

contract actions" with "cases of professional malpractice").
98. See Stephen V. O'Neal, Comment, Accrual of Statutes of Limitations: Califor
nia's Discovery Exceptions Swallow the Rule, 68 CAL. L. REv. 106, 120 (1980) ("Adop
tion of the discovery principle across the board would align judicial statements of
accrual law with its actual application"); April Enter., 147 Cal. App. 3d at 828-29, 195
Cal. Rptr. at 434 ("We agree that as a result of judicial pronouncements, the discovery
rule can be regarded as the general rule of accrual in many classes of cases in
California. ").
99. This is the effect of the limitation provision in the California Standard Form
Fire Insurance Policy, which provides that "[n]o suit or action on this policy for the
recovery of any claim shall be sustainable in any court of law or equity . . . unless
commenced within 12 months next after inception of the loss." CAL. INS. CODE § 2071
(West 1993). Although this statute applies only to fire insurance policies, most insur
ance contracts contain a similar provision. The effect of these clauses will be considered
infra Part III; the question posed here is what rule of accrual would be appropriate in
the absence of a contractual or statutory provision.
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(or the beneficiary) must submit a claim to the insurance com
pany in a timely manner,lOO and the insurer must make a deter
mination that no policy exclusions apply. Thus, most policies
provide that the insured (or the beneficiary) is not entitled to
receive pay�ent until a fixed time after the claim is submitted. lOl
When the occurrence of a condition precedent is not within the
control of the party claiming a breach, then the cause of action is
not deemed to have accrued until the condition precedent is sat
isfied. l o2 Accordingly, a cause of action for wrongful refusal to
pay benefits under the policy should not be deemed to accrue
until the insurer actually denies the insured's claim by refusing to
pay benefits due under the policy. l o3 If, however, the insurer
100. For example, the California Standard Form Fire Insurance Policy provides that
"[t]he insured shall give written notice to this company of any loss without unnecessary
delay. . . . and within 60 days after the loss, unless such time is extended in writing by
this company, the insured shall render to this company a proof of loss . . . . " CAL. INS.
CODE § 2071 (West 1993).
101. For example, the California Standard Form Fire Insurance Policy provides:
The amount of loss for which this company may be liable shall be payable 60 days
after proof of loss, as herein provided, is received by this company and ascertain
ment of the loss is made either by agreement between the insured and this company
expressed in writing or by the filing with this company of an award as herein
provided.
CAL. INS. CODE § 2071 (West 1993).
102. See, e.g., Williams v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 186 Cal. App. 3d 941, 949-51,
231 Cal. Rptr. 234, 238-40 (Ct. App. 1986) (private right of action under Fair Employ
ment and Housing Act does not accrue until Department of Fair Employment and
Housing notifies claimant that it will not take action); see also 3 B.E. WITKIN, CALIFOR
NIA PROCEDURE, AcnONS § 380 (3d ed. 1985) ("If the obligation of the defendant is
conditional upon the happening of an event or the act of a third person, the cause of
action does not accrue until that time.").
103. See Frazier v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 169 Cal. App. 3d 90, 103, 214 Cal.
Rptr. 883, 890 (Ct. App. 1985):
Mrs. Frazier's action does not commence until Metropolitan denies her claim on the
ground of suicide. Prior to such time Mrs. Frazier has a right . . . to sit back and wait
until denial of claim before urging bad faith. Because it is not until Metropolitan
actually denies the claim on the ground of suicide that Mrs. Frazier can actually
ascertain whether or not Metropolitan has acted in bad faith.
Gf, Neff v. New York Life Ins. Co., 30 Cal. 2d 165, 170, 180 P.2d 900, 904 (Cal. 1947) ("it
is apparent that defendant's above-quoted letter was an unconditional denial of liability
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simply fails to act on the claim, then the cause of action should
be deemed to accrue on the date that benefits are due under the
pOlicy. 104 If no deadline for payment is specified in the policy,
then the claim should be deemed to accrue when a "reasonable
time" has passed after the claim has been submitted to the
insurer .105
When liability insurance is involved, however, different con
siderations come into play. The claim by the third party against
the insured often will be the subject of litigation. Thus, if the
insurer wrongfully refuses to defend the insured, there is the
possibility that the limitation period for the insured's cause of
action against the insurer could expire before the underlying liti
gation is concluded.106 The insured would then be compelled
either to forego his or her bad faith claim, or to sue the insurer
while the underlying action is still pending. Litigating two law
suits simultaneously, however, can raise a number of practical
to the insured and gave rise to an immediate cause of action in favor of the insured.");
McDowell v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 404 F. Supp. 136, 147 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (measur
ing limitation period from "the refusal to pay, which was alleged to be in bad faith").
104. This assumes, of course, that the time for the insurer's response, and therefore
the date on which benefits are due, has not been extended by agreement of the parties.
"[Ilf the insurer expressly extends the one-year suit provision during its claim investiga
tion, the insurer waives its right to raise a timeliness defense to the insured's action."
Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 674, 690, 274 Cal.
Rptr. 387, 397, 798 P.2d 1230, 1240 (Cal. 1990) (In such a case, the statute of limitation
should begin to run when the extended deadline has passed). Similarly, if the insurer
causes the plaintiff to delay filing suit by means of improper conduct, the statute of
limitation could be tolled under the doctrines of fraudulent concealment or estoppel.
Id. at 689-90, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 397, 798 P.2d at 1240.
105. What constitutes a "reasonable" time would inevitably be the subject of litiga
tion; however, in the absence of legislative guidance, the courts could hold that sixty
days after proof of loss is presumptively reasonable by analogy to the statutory provi
sion in the California Standard Form Fire Insurance Policy. See supra note 100 and
accompanying text.
106. See Lambert v. Commonwealth Land ntle Ins. Co., 53 Cal. 3d 1072, 1077, 282
Cal. Rptr. 445, 447-48, 811 P.2d 737, 739-40 (Cal. 1991).
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and legal problems. l07 For example, the suit against the insurer
could alert the third-party claimant to information that might
compromise the insured's defense in the underlying action. Sec
ond, the insured might be forced to take inconsistent positions in
the two lawsuits. lOS Third, if the insured is an individual or a
small business, it is likely to be financially and emotionally im
practicable for the insured to engage in simultaneous litigation
to protect his or her rights. l09
In Lambert v. Commonwealth Land Insurance Co., 110 these
considerations led the California Supreme Court to hold that
although a cause of action against an insurer for wrongful refusal
to defend "accrues upon discovery of loss or harm, i.e., when the
insurer refuses to defend, . . . it is equitably tolled until the un
derlying action is terminated by final judgment." ll1 The court
reasoned that the duty to defend was a continuing duty, and that
failing to equitably toll the claim "would allow expiration of the
statute of limitation on a lawsuit to vindicate the duty to defend
107. These problems are analogous to the problems faced by a client who discovers
an attorney's malpractice while the underlying action is still pending. See generally
'TYler T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Wistrich, Limitation of Legal Malpractice Actions: Defin
ing Actual Injury and the Problem of Simultaneous Litigation, 24 Sw. U. L. REv. 1, 1923 (1994) (hereinafter Simultaneous Litigation).
108. For example, in the underlying litigation the insured will necessarily take the
position that the claim is without merit; however, in the bad-faith litigation against the
insurer, the insured will want to take the position that the claim had sufficient merit to
trigger the duty to defend or the duty to settle.
109. See Lambert, 53 Cal. 3d at 1078, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 448, 811 P.2d at 740 (citations
omitted) (emphasis in original):
It is harsh to require an insured - often a private homeowner - to defend the
underlying action, at the homeowner's own expense, and simultaneously to prose
cute - again at the homeowner's own expense - a separate action against the title
company for failure to defend. " [Tl he unexpected burden of defending an action
may itself make it impractical to immediately bear the additional cost and hardship
of prosecuting a collateral action against an insurer."
110. 53 Cal. 3d 1072, 282 Cal. Rptr. 445, 811 P.2d 737 (Cal. 1991).
111. Id. at 1077, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 447, 811 P.2d at 739.
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even before the duty itself expires."112 The court also empha
sized that "the contract of insurance is unique in that the pur
chaser seeks not commercial advantage, but rather peace of
mind and security in the event of unforeseen calamity,"113 and
concluded that it would be inequitable to require the insured "to
simultaneously enforce rights under the policy and defend a
costly and potentially devastating claim"114 at the insured's own
expense. ll S
The same considerations apply to a cause of action for
wrongful refusal to settle a claim brought against the insured by
a third party. In Comunale v. Traders and General Insurance
CO. ,116 the case in which the cause of action for wrongful refusal
to settle was first recognized, the California Supreme Court
stated that "[the] cause of action against the insurer arose on
August 1 3, 1 950, when the judgment in the [underlying] bodily
injury action became final."117 This result can be justified on the
ground that the insured is not injured by the wrongful refusal to
.
settle until a final judgment or settlement is reached under which
the insured is liable for an amount greater than the settlement
offer which was rejected.ns Such a holding would also be consis1 12. ld.
1 13. ld. at 1081, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 450, 811 P.2d at 742 (citations omitted).
114. ld.
115. ld. at 1078, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 448, 811 P.2d at 740.
116. 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958).
1 17. ld. at 662, 328 P.2d at 203.
1 18. See Purcell v. Colonial Ins. Co., 20 Cal. App. 3d 807, 814-15, 97 Cal. Rptr. 874,
878 (Ct. App. 1971) (dictum) (stating that although "the wrong occurred when the de
fendant refused to settle . . . the statute would of course commence to run only when
the total damages were determinable, i.e., when the amount of the pecuniary loss was
finally fixed."); Critz v. Farmers Ins. Group, 230 Cal. App. 2d 788, 799, 41 Cal. Rptr.
401, 407 (Ct. App. 1964) ("The fact of damage would become fixed and the policy
holder'S cause of action arise when he incurred a binding judgment in excess of the
policy limits."); Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 690, 319 P.2d 69, 75
(Ct. App. 1957) ("the insured's cause of action arises when he incurs a binding judg
ment in excess of the policy limit."); Larraburu Bros., Inc. v. Royal Indem. Co., 604
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tent with those California cases which have held that a cause of
action for wrongful refusal to settle may not be maintained in
the absence of a judgment in excess of the policy limits against
the insured.u9 Other California cases, however, have held or
suggested that a judgment in excess of the policy limits is not a
F.2d 1208, 1215 (9th Cir. 1979) ("the statute of limitations on [bad faith] claims . . .
begins to run from the date of the final judgment. ") (construing California law); accord,
2 CALIFORNIA LIABILITY INSURANCE PRAcnCE: CLAIMS AND LmGATION § 26.12
(Cal. CEB rev. 1994) ("Although the insurer's breach of duty occurs when it unreasona
bly refuses the settlement offer, the cause of action for failure to settle does not accrue
until the insured suffers a binding judgment in excess of policy limits and damages can
be ascertained.") Cf. lIT Small Bus. Fin. Corp. v. Niles, 9 Cal. 4th 245, 257-58, 36 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 552, 559, 885 P.2d 965, 972 (Cal. 1994) ("an action for attorney malpractice
accrues on entry of adverse judgment, settlement, or dismissal of the underlying ac
tion" because "ITI did not suffer 'actual injury' resulting from Niles's alleged malprac
tice until it settled the adversary proceeding on unfavorable terms:"). This argument is
even stronger in the insurance context, because the insured does not incur additional
attorneys' fees as a result of the wrongful refusal to settle unless there is also a breach
of the duty to defend.
119. See Finkelstein v. 20th Century Ins. Co., 11 Cal. App. 4th 926, 930, 14 Cal. Rptr.
2d 305, 307 (Ct. App. 1992) ("Since there was no judgment in excess of the policy limits,
appellant's cause of action never matured."); Doser v. Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co., 101 Cal.
App. 3d 883, 891-92, 162 Cal. Rptr. 1 15, 119-20 (Ct. App. 1980) (judgment in excess of
policy limits is "a condition precedent to [an insured's] cause of action against the in
·
surer"). This argument is also supported by the similar holding in Moradi-Shalal v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 46 Cal. 3d 287, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116, 758 P.2d 58 (Cal. 1988),
that a cause of action by a third-party claimant against an insurer for a violation of INS.
CODE § 790.03 may not be maintained absent "a final judgment determining the in
sured's liability . . . . " Id. at 311, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 131, 758 P.2d at 73. In Moradi-Shalal,
the Court overruled its prior holding in Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal.
3d 880, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842, 592 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1979) and held that no implied private
right of action arises under the statute. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 292, 250 Cal. Rptr.
at 118, 758 P.2d at 60. However, the court also held that its ruling would apply prospec
tively only, and it therefore went on to clarify the holding in Royal Globe that such a
claim "may not be brought until the action between the injured party and the insured is
concluded." Id. at 305, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 127, 758 P.2d at 69 (quoting Royal Globe).
One of the policy reasons cited in favor of its holding was that "damages suffered by the
injured party as a result of the insurer's violation . . . may best be determined after the
conclusion of the action by the third party claimant against the insured." Id. at 306, 250
Cal. Rptr. at 128, 758 P.2d at 70. As noted below, however, subsequent cases have cast
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prerequisite to maintaining an action for wrongful refusal to set
tle.120 In light of the California Supreme Court's subsequent de
cision in Lambert,121 the better rationale is that the cause of
doubt over whether Moradi-Shalal's holding applies to common-law bad-faith claims.
See infra note 120.
120. See Camelot by the Bay Condominium Owners' Ass'n v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 27
Cal. App. 4th 33, 48, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 354, 362 (Ct. App. 1994) ("there is no explicit
requirement for bad faith liability that an excess judgment is actually suffered by the
insured, since the reasonableness analysis of settlement decisions is performed in terms
of the probability or risk that such a judgment may be forthcoming in the future"); iii. at
47 n.6, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 361 n.6 ("the breach of the insurer's obligation occurs at the
time when it indulges in the unwarranted rejection of a reasonable compromise offer
within the policy limits.") (quoting Critz, supra note 1 18, 230 Cal. App. 2d at 797, 41
Cal. Rptr. at 401); Bodenhamer v. Superior Court, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1472, 1476-79, 238
Cal. Rptr. 177, 179-81 (Ct. App. 1987) (rejecting insurer's argument that a settlement or
judgment against the insured is a prerequisite to insured's bad faith action against in
surer); accord, 3 HON. H. WALTER CROSKEY ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE:
INSURANCE LmGATION en 12:340 (The Rutter Group 1995) ("The dictum in Camelot,
supra, seems correct. An excess judgment should not be essential to a bad faith action
based on unreasonable refusal to settle.") (emphasis in original). See also Isaacson v.
Cal. Ins. Guarantee Ass'n, 44 Cal. 3d 775, 793, 244 Cal. Rptr. 655, 667, 750 P.2d 297, 309
(Cal. 1988) (holding that CIGA is immune from common-law bad-faith claims, but
holding that under CIGA's statutory duty to settle, "[t]he insured need not prove his
actual liability on the underlying claim, and establishing a breach does not require a
trial of the underlying action."). This argument is also supported by cases which have
refused to extend to bad-faith claims by an insured the holding of Moradi-Shalal that a
final judgment is a condition precedent to the now-disapproved cause of action for vio
lation of INS. CODE § 790.03. These cases reason that "the duty of an insurer to its
insured is more extensive than is its duty to a third party claimant." Bodenhamer, 192
Cal. App. 3d at 1480, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 182; accord, Thicor Calif., Inc. v. Superior Court,
220 Cal. App. 2d 880, 883-84, 269 Cal. Rptr. 642, 643-44 (Ct. App. 1990) (dictum); Con
tinental Cas. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 219 Cal. App. 3d 111, 126, 268 Cal. Rptr. 193, 201
(Ct. App. 1990); Carter v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. App. 3d 424, 427-28, 239 Cal. Rptr.
723, 724-25 (Ct. App. 1987); Cal. State Auto. Ass'n, Inter-Insurance Bureau v. Superior
Court, 184 Cal. App. 3d 1428, 1432-33, 229 Cal. Rptr. 409, 412 (Ct. App. 1986); contra,
Interinsurance Exch. v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. App. 3d 1439, 1443, 262 Cal. Rptr. 392,
394 (Ct. App. 1989).
121. See Lambert v. Commonwealth Land TItle Ins. Co., 53 Cal. 3d 1072, 1080, 282
Cal. Rptr. 445, 449-50, 811 P.2d 737, 741-42 (Ct. App. 1991) (action for wrongful refusal
to defend "accrues when the insurer refuses the insured's tender of defense, but is
tolled until the underlying action is terminated by final judgment.").
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action for wrongful refusal to settle accrues on the date the in
surer refuses to settle, but that the limitation period is equitably
tolled until an adverse judgment or settlement is entered in the
underlying action.122
3.

Employment Contracts

Only a handful of cases address the issue of when a claim
for wrongful termination based on a breach of the implied cove
nant of good faith and fair dealing accrues under California law.
Although at first glance they seem to point in opposite direc
tions, they are easily reconciled with each other and with prece
dent regarding other types of wrongful termination claims.
In Eisenberg v. Insurance Co. of North America,123 the
Ninth Circuit held, in accordance with the discovery rule and
federal statutory precedent, that "[a]n employer's liability for
wrongful discharge commences upon notice of the employee's
termination even though the employee continues to serve the
employer after receipt of such notice. "124 Eisenberg is in accord
122. However, because the policies underlying simultaneous litigation must be bal
anced against the policies advanced by the statute of limitation (guaranteeing repose
and avoiding deterioration of evidence), a cause of action for wrongful refusal to defend ·
or settle a claim against the insured should not continue to be tolled after entry of
judgment while the underlying action is appealed. Cf Simultaneous Litigation, supra
note 107, at 14-19, 23-26; Laird v. Blacker, 2 Cal. 4th 606, 615, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550, 551,
828 P.2d 691, 692 (Cal. 1992) (cause of action for legal malpractice accrues upon entry
of adverse judgment or order of dismissal in the underlying action and is not tolled
during appeal); lIT Small Bus. Fin. Corp. v. Niles, 9 Cal. 4th 245, 258, 36 Cal. Rptr. 552,
559-60, 885 P.2d 965, 972-73 (Cal. 1994) (reaffirming Lain£).
123. 815 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1987).
124. [d. (applying California law). See also Daniels v. FESCO Div. of Cities Servo
Co., 733 F.2d 622, 623 (9th Cir. 1984) (applying California law) (wrongful discharge
claim; no discussion of covenant of good faith); Crossen V. Foremost-McKesson, Inc.,
537 F. Supp. 1076, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (construing California law) ("Here, the cause
of action accrued no earlier than November 29, 1978, the date of plaintiff's termination
letter") (emphasis added); cf Delaware State College V. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 257-58,
101 S. Ct. 498, 503-04 (1980) (federal TItle VII claim).
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with a recent California case holding that a claim for wrongful
termination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act and in
violation of public policy accrues "at the time the adverse em
ployment decision was communicated to her, not when it took
effect. "125
In Loehr v. Ventura Community College District,126 the
plaintiff filed a complaint alleging six counts of wrongful termi
nation, includtng "tortious breach of an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing."127 The court stated that "[a]s a gen
eral rule, the date of accrual is the date the plaintiff incurred
injury as a result of the defendant's alleged wrongful act or omis
sion. "128 In a footnote, the court added: "We note here that
plaintiff's first five causes of action accrued on May 5 , 1 980, the
date on which his employment contract was allegedly termi
nated. "129 No authority was cited, but May 5 was the day the
Board voted to discharge the plaintiff,130 and there was no indi
cation that plaintiff continued to work after that date, although
he did request on May 12, 198 0, that the Board reconsider its
action and reinstate him. Loehr is therefore not inconsistent
with the rule stated in Eisenberg.
Similarly, in Shoemaker v. Myers,l3l the court held, in a case
involving wrongful discharge in violation of public policy under
the Government Claims Act, that "[u]ntil plaintiff was termi
nated, he did not suffer appreciable harm sufficient to justify
legal action."132 However, the opinion states that "[p]laintiff was
125. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 4th 1710, 39 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 919 (Ct. App. 1995).
126. 147 Cal. App. 3d 1071, 195 Cal. Rptr. 576 (Ct. App. 1983).
127. Id. at 1077, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
128. Id. at 1078, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
129. Id. at 1082 n.7, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 583 n.7.
130. Id. at 1077, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
131. 2 Cal. App. 4th 1407, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 203 (Ct. App. 1992).
132. Id. at 1427, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 215.
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tenninated on December 2 3 , 1 981 , and this was upheld on de
partmental review on January 11 , 1 982. Plaintiff submitted a
claim to the Department on March 25 , 1 982 , within 100 days of
termination. "133 Earlier in the opinion, the court also stated that
the plaintiff "was fired for insubordination by Shuttleworth and,
on an intradepartmental appeal, senior Department officials up
held the tennination, which became effective January 11,
1 982. "134 Although the matter is not free from doubt (because
both possible dates were within 100 days of the filing of the
claim), it appears from the language used by the court that the
plaintiff continued to work while the tennination was being ap
pealed, but that the cause of action was deemed to accrue on the
date when the original "termination" occurred, rather than upon
the date it became effective. Since this is analogous to receiving
a tennination notice that takes effect on a later date, Shoemaker
is also consistent with the rule stated in Eisenberg. 135
•

4.

Other Contracts

As for claims of breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in other types of contracts, general princi
ples of accrual should apply. Thus, in Krieger v. Nick Alexander
Imports,136 the court held that a claim for breach of the implied
covenant was brought under a contract theory, and noted that
"[i]n contract actions the cause of action generally accrues at the
time of the breach."137 The court also noted that the discovery
rule was an exception to this principle; however, it held that the
133. Id. (citations omitted) .
134. Id. at 1415, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 206-07 (emphasis added) .
135. A definitive resolution of this issue may be forthcoming. The California
Supreme Court recently granted review in a case which distinguished the Eisenberg
rule. See Romano v. Rockwell Int'l, Inc., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77 (Ct. App. 1995) , review
granted, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 205, 909 P.2d 327 (Cal. 1996 ).
136. 234 Cal. App. 3d 205, 285 Cal. Rptr. 717 (Ct. App. 1991 ) .
137. Id. at 221, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
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discovery rule did not apply in the absence of a fiduciary rela
tionship or similar duty.138 The court therefore granted sum
mary judgment on this claim.139
Although Krieger correctly recognizes that general princi
ples of accrual should apply to claims for breach of the implied
covenant, it is incorrect in limiting the discovery rule to cases in
which a fiduciary relationship or similar duty exists. The discov
ery rule is a general rule of accrual that should be applied in all
cases in which a plaintiff could not reasonably be expected to
discover the facts concerning his or her cause of action until a
future time.l40 Thus, for example, the court in Krieger correctly
held that the discovery rule applies to an action for breach of
warranty of future performance under the Uniform Commercial
Code.141 Krieger should also have held the same with regard to
the related claim for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.
III.
A.

CONTRACTUAL MODIFICATION OF THE LIMITATION
PERIOD

Validity of Contractual Modification

1.

General Principles

As noted above,142 most insurance policies contain a clause
that limits the time within which an action may be commenced
against the insurer. For example, California's Standard Form
138. Id. at 221-22, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
139. Id., 285 Cal. Rptr. at 727-28.
140. See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
141. Krieger, 34 Cal. App. 3d at 218, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 725. See CAL. CoM. CODE
§ 2725(2) (West Supp. 1996) (emphasis added):
A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved
party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender
of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future perform
ance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such perform
ance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.
142. See supra note 99.
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Fire Insurance Policy143 contains the following clause: "No suit
or action on this policy for the recovery of any claim shall be
sustainable in any court of law or equity . . . unless commenced
within 12 months next after inception of the loss. "144 Such a
clause, if enforced, has two effects. First, it shortens the limita
tion period from four years for an action upon a written instru
ment145 to one year. Second, it changes the date of accrual of
the limitation period from the date the contract was breached
(i.e., the date the claim is denied) to the earlier date of the incep
tion of the loss.
The California Supreme Court first considered the validity
of a contractual limitation clause in 1909. In Tebbets v. Fidelity
& Casualty Co. of New York,146 the life insurance policy pro
vided that "legal proceedings for recovery hereunder may not be
brought before the expiry of three months from the date of filing
proofs at the company's home office, nor brought at all unless
begun within six months from the time of death. ''147 The court
held that "a condition in a policy of insurance, providing that no
recovery shall be had thereon unless suit be brought within a
given time, is valid, if the time limited be in itself not unreasona
ble. "148 The court reasoned that since a defendant may waive
143. CAL. INS. CoDE § 2071 (West 1993).
144. Id. The origin and purpose of this provision was described by former Chief
Justice 'fraynor as follows:
The short statutory limitation in the present case is the result of long insistence by
insurance companies that they have additional protection against fraudulent proofs,
which they could not meet if claims could be sued upon within four years as in the
case of actions on other written instruments. Originally the shortened limitation
periods were inserted into policies by insurers. Some courts declared such provi
sions void as against public policy while other courts enforced them to protect free
dom of contract.
Bollinger v. National Fire Ins. of Hartford, 25 Cal. 2d 399, 407, 154 P.2d 399, 403-04
(Cal. 1944) (citations omitted).
145. CAL. CIV. PROC. CoDE § 337(1) (West 1982).
146. 155 Cal. 137, 99 P. 501 (Cal. 1909).
147. Id. at 138, 99 P. at 502.
148. Id.
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the statute of limitation as a defense to an action, a plaintiff
should have "[the] right to waive a portion of the time granted
by the statute for the commencement of an action. "149 Since
"[t]he six months' period was not in itself unreasonable,"150 the
court affirmed the dismissal of the action.
The I:ule announced in Tebbets that a contractual limitation
clause will be upheld if not unreasonable has consistently been
reaffirmed. l 5l Thus, in Prudential-LMI Commercial Insurance
Co. v. Superior Court,152 the California Supreme Court expressly
upheld the validity of the limitation-of-suit provision in Califor
nia Insurance Code section 2071: "Such a covenant shortening
the period of limitations is a valid provision of an insurance con
tract and cannot be ignored with impunity as long as the limita
tion is not so unreasonable as to show imposition or undue
advantage. One year was not an unfair period of limitation. "153
149. Id. at 139, 99 P. at 502.
150. Id.
151. See, e.g., Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d
674, 683, 274 Cal. Rptr. 387, 393, 798 P.2d 1230, 1236 (Cal. 1990); Fageol Truck & Coach
Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co., 18 Cal. 2d 748, 753, 117 P,2d 669, 672 (Cal. 1941); Beeson v.
Schloss, 183 Cal. 618, 622, 192 P. 292, 294 (Cal. 1920); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Superior Court, 210 Cal. App. 3d 604, 608-09, 258 Cal. Rptr. 413, 415-16 (Ct. App.
1989); Lawrence v. W. Mutual Ins. Co., 204 Cal. App. 3d 565, 571, 251 Cal. Rptr. 319,
322 (Ct. App. 1988); C & H Foods Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 163 Cal. App. 3d 1055, 1064,
211 Cal. Rptr. 765, 769-70 (Ct. App. 1984).
152. 51 Cal. 3d 674, 274 Cal. Rptr. 387, 798 P.2d 1230 (Cal. 1990).
153. Id. at 683, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 393, 798 P.2d at 1236, quoting C & H Foods, 163
Cal. App. 3d at 1064, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 769-70, quoting Fageol, 18 Cal. 2d at 753, 1 17
P.2d at 672. Prudential added that "[w]hen a clause in an insurance policy is authorized
by statute, it is deemed consistent with public policy as established by the Legislature."
Prudentia� 51 Cal. 3d at 684, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 393, 798 P.2d at 1236 (citation omitted).
Conversely, where the Legislature has fixed a minimum limitation period by statute, a
shorter contractual limitation period will be deemed invalid. Cf Hayman v. Sitmar
Cruises, Inc., 14 Cal. App. 4th 1499, 1505, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 412, 415 (Ct. App. 1993)
(maritime contract; "the challenged limitations clause is not reasonable because it effec
tively shortens the time to institute suit, in violation of [46 U.S.c. Appx.] section
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The principle that a contractual limitation clause will be up
held unless there is "imposition or undue advantage" suggests a
congruence with the doctrine of unconscionability. California
Civil Code section 1670.5,154 enacted in 1979, "codified the es
tablished doctrine that a court can refuse to enforce an uncon
scionable provision in a contract. "155 Unconscionability has
been defined as "an absence of meaningful choice on the part of
one of the parties together with contract terms which are unrea
sonably favorable to the other party."156 The leading California
case elaborated on this definition as follows:
[U] nconscionability has both a "procedural" and a "substantive"
element. The procedural element focuses on two factors: "op
pression" and "surprise." "Oppression" arises from an inequality
of bargaining power which results in no real negotiation and "an
absence of meaningful choice." "Surprise" involves the extent to
which the supposedly agreed-upon terms of the bargain are hid
den in a prolix printed form drafted by the party seeking to en
force the disputed terms. . . . No precise definition of substantive
unconscionability can be proffered. Cases have talked in terms
of "overly harsh" or "one-sided" results .... [But] "unconsciona-

183b."); CAL. CoM. CoDE § 2725(1) (West 1996) ("By the original agreement the par
ties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year . . . . ").
154. If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the con
tract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may re
fuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract
without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
CAL. CIY. CODE § 1670.5(a) (West 1985).
155. Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 38 Cal. 3d 913, 925, 216 Cal. Rptr. 345, 353, 702
P.2d 503, 511 (Cal. 1985). The Perdue court noted that "[s]ection 1670.5 is based upon
Uniform Commercial Code section 2-302, but expands coverage to include noncommer
cial contracts." Id. at 913 n.10, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 353 n.10, 702 P.2d at 511 n.10.
156. A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 486, 186 Cal. Rptr.
114, 121 (Ct. App. 1983), (quoting Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d
445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965» .
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bility turns not only on a "one-sided" result, but also on an ab
sence of "justification" for it. ,, 157
The case law concerning the enforceability of contractual
limitation provisions is remarkably similar to this definition of
unconscionability. In practice, courts have enforced contractual
limitation periods because of an absence of unfair surprise158 and
because of the presumed substantive reasonableness of the one
year period.159 Consequently, the only California court to ad
dress the issue has held that "[t]he enactment of [Civil Code]
section 1670.5 expands our scrutiny of limitation of actions pro-

157. A & M Produce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 486-87, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 121-22 (citations
omitted). In Perdue, the California Supreme Court approved this analysis "an alterna
tive analytical framework" to its opinion in Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 807,
171 Cal. Rptr. 604, 623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1981), and noted that "[b]oth pathways should
lead to the same result." See Perdue, 38 Cal. 3d at 925 n.9, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 353 n.9, 7f12
P.2d at 511 n.9. In practice, however, California courts have followed the A & M Pro
duce analysis. See, e.g., Samura v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 17 Cal. App. 4th 1284,
1296-97, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 20, 27-28 (Ct. App. 1993); U.S. Roofing, Inc. v. Credit Alliance
Corp., 228 Cal. App. 3d 1431, 1448, 279 Cal. Rptr. 533, 543 (Ct. App. 1991); Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Superior Court, 211 Cal. App. 3d 758, 767-78, 259 Cal. Rptr.
789, 794-95 (Ct. App. 1989).
158. See, e.g., C & H Foods Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 163 Cal. App. 3d 1055, 1064,
211 Cal. Rptr. 765. 770 (Ct. App. 1984) ("As the policies clearly so provided, and in
view of the fact that plaintiffs do not deny that C & H was furnished the policies, we
reject plaintiffs' claim that they were unaware of that provision."); West v. Henderson,
227 Cal. App. 3d 1578, 1586-87, 278 Cal. Rptr. 570, 574-75 (Ct. App. 1991) (limitation
provision in lease was not oppressive as to plaintiff because "[k]nowing her own inexpe
rience, she signed the lease without consulting an attol1ley (despite a prominent admo
nition in the lease to do so)").
159. See, e.g., Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d
674, 684, 274 Cal. Rptr. 387, 393, 798 P.2d 1230, 1236 (Cal. 1990) ("When a clause in an
insurance policy is authorized by statute, it is deemed consistent with public policy as
established by the Legislature."); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Superior Court, 210 Cal.
App. 3d 604, 609, 258 Cal. Rptr. 413, 416 (Ct. App. 1989) ("[i]t makes no difference
whether the limitations provision in question is statutory or contractual. Not only . . . is
there no fundamental difference between the two, but also, the one-year policy period
of limitations in insurance contracts is specifically authorized by statute.").
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visions from an analysis of the reasonableness of the provision to
the broader analysis of the conscionability of the provision. "160
Although the California courts have upheld the validity of
contractual limitation clauses in general, and the limitation-of
suit provision of Insurance Code section 2071 in particular, two
important questions remain. First, to what extent does a con
tractual limitation provision apply to causes of action for breach
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing? Second, to what
extent may the contractual limitation provision change the
otherwise applicable rule of accrual?

2. Applicability to Bad Faith Actions
There is a split of authority regarding the extent to which a
contractual limitation clause applies to a claim for breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Although the majority
of California cases hold that an action for breach of the implied
covenant is barred whenever suit on the contract would be
barred, two California cases have held that a bad-faith suit may
be maintained notwithstanding a contractual limitation-of-suit
provision.
In Murphy v. Allstate Insurance CO. ,161 the plaintiff home
owners alleged that Allstate conspired with Golden West Con
struction Company and others to defraud plaintiffs after their
house was substantially damaged by fire. Specifically, they al160. West, 227 Cal. App. 3d at 1585-86, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 574. Although the statutory
language indicates that a clause must be unconscionable "at the time it was made," in
practice courts analyze the effect of the provision as applied. See, e.g., West, 227 Cal.
App. 3d at 1588, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 576 (although contractual provision limiting defenses
as wel1 as claims might be "unjustifiably inequitable" in a hypothetical situation, it is
"irrelevant to this case because it is not being asserted against West"). This is consistent
with the statutory language providing that the court "may so limit the application of any
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result." CAL. CIv. CoDE § 1670.5
(West 1985) (emphasis added).
161. 83 Cal. App. 3d 38, 47, 147 Cal. Rptr. 565, 572 (Ct. App. 1978).
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leged that Allstate arranged with the other defendants to pre
serve and repair the damaged home, and represented that they
were qualified to do the work.162 In fact, Golden West was not a
licensed contractor, and plaintiffs alleged that "neither it nor the
other persons and firms were competent or qualified to do the
work for which they were engaged,"1 63 and that the work was
done so poorly "that both the home and the furniture and the
furnishings were further damaged."I64 Plaintiffs further alleged
that after the amount of the loss was fixed by an appraiser se
lected by the parties, Allstate filed an interpleader action to re
solve the claims of the contractors to the proceeds which delayed
payment for nearly two years.165 Plaintiffs pleaded causes of ac
tion for fraud, conspiracy to defraud, two counts of bad faith
breach of the implied covenant, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress.166
Construing the statutory phrase "[n]o suit or action on this
policy for the recovery of any claim," the court held that the
statute only applied to "a claim for a loss covered by the pol
icy,"167 and that "[n]one of plaintiff's alleged causes of action are
actions 'on the policy' of insurance. "168 The court noted that the
162. Id. at 41-42, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 569.
163. Id. at 42, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 569.
164. Id. , 147 Cal. Rptr. at 569.
165. Id. at 43, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 570.
166. Id. at 43-44, 47-48, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 572, 573.
167. Id. at 44, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 571. Murphy cited Stockton Combined Harvester
and Agric. Works v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 98 Cal. 557, 33 P. 633 (Cal. 1893), a California
Supreme Court case in which the insurer and insured had submitted a claim to binding
arbitration. Stockton sued to collect the award, and the defendant tried to set up the
limitation of action clause in the policy as a defense. The Stockton court held: "The
distinction between . . . an action upon an award fixing the liability of an insurer [under
an insurance contract, and a cause of action upon a policy of insurance] . . . is marked
and important. . . In such a case, the action is not upon the policy, but upon the agree
ment to pay. " Stockton, 98 Cal. at 569, 33 P. at 634.
168. Murphy, 83 Cal. App. 3d at 46, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 572.
.
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third and fourth counts "purport to state one or more causes of
action for bad faith, that is, unjustified refusal to pay or pro
longed delay in paying legitimate claims under the policy."169
Allstate argued that "plaintiffs' bad faith claim is based upon al
leged breaches of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing
which arises only because of the contract of insurance.'mo The
court rejected this argument:
[T]here is a significant difference between "arising out of the
contractual relationship" and "on the policy. . . . " Much of the
conduct complained of in the third and fourth causes of action
occurred long after the fire loss and related to the repair and
restoration of plaintiffs' home and personal property and the em
ployment of persons and firms to do that work, [and] the institu
tion and prosecution of the interpleader action. Here again, the
damages claimed were not caused by any risk insured against
under the policy and were not recoverable under the pOlicy. l 71
was followed by Frazier v. Metropolitan Life Insurance CO. ,112 in which the insurer denied the plaintiff's claim
under a life insurance policy on the grounds that she had not
proved that the decedent had not committed suicide. The Fra
zier court held that "the policy time limitation, even if reason
able, does not bar this action based on the hybrid contractual
nature of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing."173
The court relied in part on Murphy, and in part on the ground
that the bad-faith cause of action could not be deemed to accrue
until the insurer denied the claim:
The trial judge held that plaintiff's breach of contract claim was
barred by the time limitations of the contract, but that since her
cause of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
Murphy

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at 47, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 573.
Id. at 48, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 573.
Id. at 49, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 574.

169 Cal. App. 3d 90, 98, 214 Cal. Rptr. 883, 886 (Q. App. 1985).
Id. at 104, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 891.

HeinOnline -- 26 Sw. U. L. Rev. 42 1996-1997

1996]

UNRAVELING THE TANGLED WEB

43

dealing did not accrue until the claim on the double indemnity
portion of the contract was denied, . . . the action was timely filed
under the policy for breach of that covenant. . . . [A]s found by
the trial judge, Mrs. Frazier's action does not commence until
Metropolitan denies her claim on the ground of suicide. Prior to
such time Mrs. Frazier has a right (so far as the policy limitation
is concerned) to sit back and wait until denial of a claim before
urging bad faith. Because it is not until Metropolitan actually
denies the claim on the ground of suicide that Mrs. Frazier can
actually ascertain whether or not Metropolitan has acted in bad
faith.17 4
In contrast to Murphy and Frazier, Lawrence v. Western
Mutual Insurance CO. l 7S held that "the one-year commencement
of suit provision also precludes Lawrence from recovery on the
cause of action for alleged tortious bad faith in handling his
claim because of purported misrepresentations in the policy con
cerning coverage." l76 In Lawrence, the plaintiff suffered exten
sive damage to his house due to inadequate compaction of the
fill beneath the foundationY7 In late 1 98 3 and early 1984, the
plaintiff incurred expenses of $250,000 for geological reports and
correction of the problemYs However, Lawrence did not pres
ent a claim to his insurer at that time, because the policy con
tained an exclusion for earth movement.l79 In July 1 985,
Lawrence consulted an attorney, who advised him that since the
settlement was caused by the negligence of a third party, the loss
might be covered despite the exclusion. lso Lawrence submitted

174. Id. at 103, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 890.
175. 204 Cal. App. 3d 565, 251 Cal. Rptr. 319 (Ct. App. 1988).
176. Id. at 574-75, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 324.
177. Id. at 569, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 569-70, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 320-21.
180. Id. at 570, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
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a claim on July 15, 1985, which was denied on January 7, 1986,
and Lawrence filed suit on January 28, 1986.181
Lawrence argued that "inception of the loss" incorporated a
discovery rule of accrual, and that therefore the contractual limi
tation period did not begin to run until "the insured knew or
should have known that a loss has occurred which is covered by
his insurance policy. "182 The court disagreed, holding that under
the discovery rule, "[i]t is the occurrence of some . . . cognizable
event rather than knowledge of its legal significance that starts
the running of the statute of limitations. "183 Therefore, since
Lawrence had obtained reports in December 1983 concerning
the cause of the damage, he was placed on inquiry notice "from
which he could have surmised that his loss was due to the negli
gence of a third party. "184
In holding that Lawrence's bad-faith claim was subject to
the contractual limitation period, the court attempted to distin
guish the prior cases:
Lawrence's allegation of tortious bad faith relates to the com
plete denial of the claim on the underlying policy. In both Mur
phy and Frazier, a subsequent event occurred after the initial
policy coverage was triggered which was the basis for the cause of
action. The subsequent event related to the policy, but either
was not a claim directly on the policy (Murphy) or was a claim
which arose after the insurer paid on the policy but did so not to
the satisfaction of the beneficiary of the policy (Frazier). Here,
Lawrence's cause of action for bad faith in purportedly misrepre181. ld.
182. ld. at 571-72, 25 � Cal. Rptr. at 322.
183. [d. at 573, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 323, (quoting McGee v. Weinberg, 97 Cal. App. 3d
798, 804, 159 Cal. Rptr. 86, 90 (Ct. App. 1979» . See also Gutierrez v. Mofid, 39 Cal. 3d
892, 898, 218 Cal. Rptr. 313, 316, 705 P.2d 886, 889 (Cal. 1985) (cause of action for
medical malpractice accrues even though "plaintiff is ignorant of his legal remedy or the
legal theories underlying his cause of action.").
184. Lawrence, 204 Cal. App. 3d at 572, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 322-23.
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senting the scope of coverage in the policy is fundamentally a
claim on the policy and is thus time barred.1 85
Shortly after Lawrence was decided, the same conclusion
was reached in Abari v. State Farm Fire and Casualty CO.186 In
Abari, the plaintiff alleged that he first noticed cracks in his
home in 1979, and that after renting the property for several
years, he observed more severe cracks and damage when he re
turned in September 1984.187 Abari consulted an attorney and
submitted a claim to State Farm on January 21, 1985, then filed
suit on January 23, 1985.188 The court refused to credit Abari's
argument that he was not put on inquiry notice in 1979, because
Abari had failed to plead that he "was not alerted to the gravity
of the damage" at that time, despite having been given two op
portunities to amend his pleading to include such an allega
tion.189 The court in Abari also attempted to distinguish
Murphy :
In Murphy, the plaintiffs complained of wrongful conduct by the
insurer subsequent to their fire loss, and alleged unjustified re
fusal to pay or prolonged delay in paying legitimate claims under
the policy. As such, the bad faith "damages claimed were not
caused by any risk insured against under the policy and were not
recoverable under the policy." Contrarily, Abari alleged in both
the bad faith and unfair practices counts that "[b]y reason of de
fendants STATE FARM . . . breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, plaintiff has been and continues to be damaged
in an amount equal to the benefits payable under the policies,
plus interest thereon." Abari's pleading thus reveals his bad faith
and unfair practices claims are a transparent attempt to recover

185. Id. at 575, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 324-25.
186. 205 Cal. App. 3d 530, 252 Cal. Rptr. 565 (Ct. App. 1988).
187. Id. at 533, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 566.
188. ld. at 532-33, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 565.
189. Id. at 535, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 567.
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on the policy, notwithstanding his failure to commence suit within

one year of accrual.l90
Subsequent cases have followed Lawrence and Abari in holding
that a bad faith claim is barred by the expiration of the contrac
tual limitation period "where the gravamen of the bad faith ac
tion pertained to the insurer's handling of the initial claim for
loss. "191 This view is also supported by the California Supreme
Court's opinion in Prudential-LMI Commercial Insurance v. Su
perior Court,l92 in which the court, in dicta, quoted Abari's hold
ing on this point with apparent approval.1 93
But the issue will not go away, because Lawrence's and
Abari's attempts to distinguish Murphy and Frazier are ex
tremely unpersuasive. Lawrence gives no reason why the partial
denial of the plaintiff's claim in bad faith in Frazier should take
the cause of action outside the contractual limitation period,
while the complete denial of the claim in Lawrence should not.194
Similarly, although Murphy, unlike Frazier, at least involved
190. ld. at 536, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 567-68 (citations omitted).
191. Velasquez v. 'Ii'uck Ins. Exch., 1 Cal. App. 4th 712, 720, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d I, 5 (Ct.
App. 1991); see also Magnolia Square Homeowners Ass'n v. Safeco Ins. Co., 221 Cal.
App. 3d 1049, 1063, 271 Cal. Rptr. I, 9 (Ct. App. 1990).
192. 51 Cal. 3d 674, 274 Cal. Rptr. 387, 798 P.2d 1230 (Cal. 1990).
193. ld. at 686, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 394-95, 798 P.2d at 1237. However, despite its
apparent approval of Abari, the Prudential opinion largely eliminates the problem
which Murphy and Frazier attempted to address by changing the rules of accrual and
tolling with respect to contract and bad faith claims. See infra notes 206-30 and accom
panying text.
194. See Prieto v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 225 Cal. App. 3d 1188, 1 194-95, 275
Cal. Rptr. 362, 365 (Ct. App. 1990) ("in both Frazier and the instant case the insurer's
alleged misconduct involved breach of a primary obligation to pay policy benefits.").
Because Prieto recognized that the claim in Frazier was essentially identical, it chose
instead to repudiate Frazier:
[W]e find neither reason nor authority to signify that a plaintiff's election to seek
redress under the implied covenant rather than the express contract should nUllify
the legislatively prescribed limitation for actions that are "on- the policy" because
grounded in a failure to pay benefits that are due under the policy and indeed con
stitute its very reason for being.
ld. at 1195, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 365-66.
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conduct in addition to the denial of benefits, both Lawrence and
Abari fail to explain why the breach of a "duty not to withhold
unreasonably payments due under a policy"195 in Murphy should
be taken outside the contractual limitation period simply be
cause the insurer allegedly conspired with third parties to avoid
its contractual obligation, rather than denying the claim outright,
as in Lawrence and Abari.196
The key to understanding this dilemma is recognizing that
the contractual limitation provision modifies the date of accrual
as well as the applicable limitation period. Thus, the possibility
foreseen in Frazier that the limitation period might expire before
the cause of action accrues under otherwise-applicable law1 97 is
not limited to bad faith claims, but would also apply to ordinary
claims to collect the benefits due "on the policy." This anomaly
could occur for one of two reasons. First, the insurer could delay
responding to the plaintiff's claim until after the contractual limi
tation period had expired.1 98 This would not happen under gen
eral accrual principles, because a "breach" would not occur until
the insurer denied the claim or the deadline for responding had
195. Murphy, 83 Cal. App. 3d at 49, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 574.
196. It should be noted that this argument applies only to the bad-faith claim in
Murphy, which necessarily rested on the implied covenant of good faith and fair deal
ing, and therefore arguably should be considered a claim "on the policy." The other
causes of action in Murphy were tort claims for fraud and intentional infliction of emo
tional distress, neither of which required or depended on the existence of a contractual
duty. See Murphy, 83 Cal. App. 3d at 46-47, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 572-73 (fraud claim); iii.
at 49-50, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 574-75 (emotional distress claim).
197. See Frazier, 169 Cal. App. 3d at 103, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 890.
198. See Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 674, 69293, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 399, 798 P.2d at 1242 (Cal. 1990) ("It was not until September 1987
that plaintiffs claim was denied unequivocally. Thus, if the one-year suit provision
were literally applied, plaintiffs suit would have been untimely before the insurer de
nied coverage."); see also Frazier, 169 Cal. App. 3d at 103, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 890. Simi
larly, in Murphy the insurer caused the payment of the claim to be delayed nearly two
years while it pursued an interpleader action, allegedly in bad faith. Murphy, 83 Cal.
App. 3d at 42-43, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 570.
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passed.199 Contractual limitation provisions, however, seem to
measure the period from the happening of the contingent event
("inception of the loss"). Second, if the contractual limitation
period begins running upon the happening of the contingent
event, rather than upon the discovery of the cause of action, bad
faith conduct by the insurer subsequent to denial of the insured's
claim might not occur, or reasonably might not be discovered,
until after the contractual limitation period has expired. Barring
suit in circumstances such as these would be absurd.
This anomaly could be resolved in one of three ways. First,
courts could hold that the limitation provision in the policy is
unconscionable as applied unless it permits the plaintiff a reason
able time within which to sue. If the provision is unconsciona
ble, the court could refuse to enforce it and instead apply the
default limitation periods discussed in Part II, above. While this
would be consistent with the general test for .the validity of con
tractual limitation provisions, it is difficult, to say the least, to
find a legal basis for holding that a provision authorized by stat
ute is void for unconscionability.
Second, in order to provide a legal basis for holding the stat
utory provision invalid, courts could hold that the statute, as ap
plied in certain cases, is an unconstitutional deprivation of due
process. For example, the New Mexico Supreme Court has held
that "[ d]ue process requires a limitations statute to provide a
reasonable period within which an accrued right may be exer
cised. "200 The court analogized the situation to that in which the
Legislature passes a statute that retroactively shortens the appli-

199. See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
200. Garcia v. La Farge, 893 P.2d 428, 437 (N.M. 1995); see also 5 RONALD ANDER
SON, ANDERSON ON TIlE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-725:11 (3d ed. 1985 & Rev.
1994) ("Questions of constitutionality may also be engendered by a disparity in fixing
the beginning date for the running of the statute of limitations period.").
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cable limitation period.201 In the latter situation, California
courts have consistently held that the new statute must be inter
preted to allow a "reasonable time to sue" for claims that were
not yet expired at the time the act was passed, in order to avoid
constitutional problems.202 However, unlike New Mexico, the
majority of jurisdictions have resisted extending such an argu
ment to all statutes of limitation.203
The third solution is to attack the causes of the potential
problem: unreasonable delay by the insurer in responding to the
plaintiff's claim, and the accrual of the contractual limitation pe
riod before discovery of the cause of action. The legal basis for
this solution will be discussed in the following section.
B.

Accrual on Discovery and Equitable Tolling of Limitation
Period

As noted above, the California Standard Form Fire Insur
ance Policy provides for a one-year limitation period commenc201. Garcia, 893 P.2d at 437. ("It is no less arbitrary when an existing statute of
repose is applied to bar a claim accruing near the end of the limitations period than
when a newly enacted limitations period is applied to a cause of action existing at the
time of the enactment.").
202. See, e.g., Brown v. Bleiberg, 32 Cal. 3d 426, 437, 186 Cal. Rptr. 228, 233-34, 651
P.2d 815, 820-21 (Cal. 1982) (citations and footnotes omitted):
The 1970 enactment and the 1975 amendment [of CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE § 340.5]
. . . could not be given retroactive effect so as to wipe out plaintiffs claim, but the
Legislature may restrict the period of limitations on a pending claim so long as the
plaintiff is given "a reasonable time in which to sue." A statute shortening the stat
ute of limitations may be interpreted prospectively to avoid constitutional problems
which would attend retroactivity.
203. See, e.g., Brubaker v. Cavanaugh, 741 F.2d 318, 321 (10th Cir. 1984) (" [Statutes
of limitation] sometimes expire before a claimant has sustained any injury, . . . or before
he knows he has sustained an injury . . . . If the limitation period is otherwise reason
able, a claimant is not thereby deprived of his right to due process.") (quoting Jewson v.
Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d 405, 411 (8th Cir. 1982» ; accord, Admire Bank & nust v. City of
Emporia, 829 P.2d 578, 586 (Kan. 1992); 5 RON ALD ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE
UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CODE § 2-275:11 (3d ed. 1985 & Rev. 1994) ("The courts have
not been troubled by the theoretical considerations discussed above and have found
statute of limitations provisions constitutional. ").
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ing upon "inception of the loss. "204 Many contractual limitation
clauses are similar.20s This provision was derived from the New
York Standard Fire Insurance Policy, which originally provided
that suit must be brought "within twelve months next after the
fire," but was amended to the present language "as insurance
coverage was expanded to cover more than fire (e.g., theft, light
ning and other property damage) . . . . "206
If interpreted literally, this language would commence the
contractual limitation period upon the happening of the contin
gent event for which coverage is provided. In many cases, such a
provision would cause little difficulty; for example, the date of
"inception of the loss" is easily determined in the case of a fire
or life insurance policy. When other types of property damages
are at issue, however, the date of "inception of the loss" may not
be so clear. For example, in the case of progressive property
damage caused by construction defects, the wrongful act may oc
cur long before any damage occurs, and the damage may not
then be discovered for a long time. Thus, unless "inception of
the loss" is defined in accordance with the discovery rule of ac
crual, the shortened one-year period may well expire before the
insured is aware of his or her cause of action.

204. CAL. INS. CoDE § 2071 (West 1993).
205. See, e.g., Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d
'
674, 680 n.2, 274 Cal. Rptr. 387, 390 n.2, 798 P.2d 1230, 1233 n.2 (Cal. 1991) (policy
provision barring suit "unless commenced within twelve months next after the happen
ing of the loss" (emphasis added); but holding that "[w]e perceive no legal difference
between 'inception' and 'happening' for purposes of resolving the questions
presented."); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Superior Court, 210 Cal. App. 3d 604, 610,
258 Cal. Rptr. 413, 416 (Ct. App. 1989) ("the differences between 'occurrence' and
'inception of the loss' are trivial; if anything . . . the policy provision is an improvement
in the direction of plain English."); Magnolia Square Homeowners Ass'n v. Safeco Ins.
Co., 221 Cal. App. 3d 1049, 1059 n.3, 271 Cal. Rptr. 1, 6 n.3 (Ct. App. 1990) ("No less
trivial is the difference between 'inception of the loss' and 'loss occurs."').
206. Prudential, 51 Cal. 3d at 682-83, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 392, 798 P.2d at 1235.
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This problem has been partially alleviated by the California
Supreme Court's holding in Prudential-LMI Commercial Insur
ance v. Superior Court207 that for first-party insurance claims
concerning progressive property damage, "the one-year suit pro
vision begins to run on the date of inception of the loss, defined
as that point in time when appreciable damage occurs and is or
should be known to the insured, such that a reasonable insured
would be aware that his notification duty under the policy has
been triggered. "208 The court thus approved of the holdings in
Lawrence and Abari that "'inception of the loss' means that
point in time at which appreciable damage occurs so that a rea
sonable insured would be on notice of a potentially insured
loss."209 Under Prudential, contingent events which have a defi
nite date of occurrence (such as a fire) will be presumed to place
the insured on inquiry notice and will commence the running of
the contractual limitation period;210 but contingent events which
by their nature are difficult to discover will not trigger the con
tractual limitation period until the insured is on inquiry notice
concerning the event.
Using the discovery rule, however, only solves part of the
problem. Even if the shortened limitation period commences
upon the discovery of the contingent event, another problem
may arise. Under the default rules of accrual, the cause of action
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
207. 51 Cal. 3d 674, 274 Cal. Rptr. 387, 798 P.2d 1230 (Cal. 1990).
208. [d. at 678, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 389, 798 P.2d at 1232; see also id. at 686, 274 Cal.
Rptr. at 395, 798 P.2d at 1238 ("We agree that 'inception of the loss' should be deter
mined by reference to reasonable discovery of the loss and not necessarily turn on the
occurrence of the physical event causing the loss.").
209. [d. at 685, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 394, 798 P.2d at 1237.
210. See, e.g., Prieto v. State Fann Fire & Cas. Co., 225 Cal. App. 3d 1188, 1196, 275
Cal. Rptr. 362, 366 (Ct. App. 1990) ("The statute still must be deemed to have begun
running on the date of the fire, because the complaint alleges a sufficiently disastrous
loss, at which plaintiffs were personally present, to alert them immediately.").
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would not accrue until the insurer denied the claim, or at least
until the deadline for paying benefits under the policy had
passed.211 If the limitation period starts running earlier, how
ever, it is possible that the one-year period will expire before the
insurer denies the claim, thereby terminating the insured's rights
even before they would have accrued under the discovery
rule.212 Indeed, the insurer could even delay processing the
claim on purpose, in the hope that the insured will neglect to file
suit while waiting for a response.
A situation somewhat similar to the latter was presented in
Bollinger v. National Fire Insurance CO.213 There, the plaintiff
sued the insurer to recover for a covered fire loss. The defend
ant insurer "requested and obtained numerous continuances and
extensions of time, thereby delaying the time of trial" for one
year; then it moved for a nonsuit on the ground that the action
was prematurely filed.214 The trial court erroneously granted the
motion and dismissed the action; but instead of appealing the
trial court's ruling, the plaintiff refiled the action in another
county after the shortened limitation period had passed.215
Plaintiff alleged that the action would have been filed on time
but for the defendant's intentional delay in raising the issue that
the previous action was premature.216
Faced with an egregious example of alleged intentional con
duct in bad faith?1? but unable to change the date of accrual
211. See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
212. See, e.g., Prudential, 51 Cal. 3d at 692-93, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 399, 798 P.2d at 1242
("Thus, if the one-year suit provision were literally applied, plaintiffs suit would have
been untimely before the insurer denied coverage.").
213. 25 Cal. 2d 399, 154 P.2d 399 (Cal. 1944).
214. Id. at 402, 154 P.2d at 401.
215. Id. at 402-03, 154 P.2d at 401. At that time, INS. CODE § 2071 contained a
fifteen-month limitation provision. Id. at 402, 154 P.2d at 401.
216. Id. at 403, 154 P.2d at 401.
217. See id. at 407-08, 154 P.2d at 404 (citations omitted):
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contained in the statutory insurance policy, the court created a
novel solution: the doctrine of equitable tolling. First, it noted
that virtually all jurisdictions have held that statutory tolling pro
visions which were "designed to prevent technical forfeitures
under statutes of limitation also apply to the limitation period
incorporated by statute into every insurance pOlicy."218 Next, it
held that Code of Civil Procedure section 355219 should be "sup
plemented by judicial construction and applied beyond its literal
language to accomplish its purpose."220 Finally, the court boldly
asserted that "[i]n any event this court is not powerless to formu
late rules of procedure where justice demands it."221
Although the doctrine of equitable tolling rests upon a
questionable legal basis,222 its flexible dimensions make it attrac
tive to courts seeking practical solutions to limitation problems.
Thus, equitable tolling was used in the insurance context as the
basis for the holding in Lambert v. Commonwealth Land Title
Insurance CO.223 that although the duty to defend accrues when
the insurer refuses the insured's tender of defense, the limitation
period is tolled until the underlying action is terminated by a
final judgment.224 Similarly, when faced with the issue of accrual
[Ilt is clear to us that defendant's conduct furnished the occasion for the delay and
that it cannot take advantage of a situation which was of its own creation. Under
the circumstances of the present case it would be manifestly unjust for this court to
prevent a trial on the merits . . . by enforcing the fifteen-month limitation period
when the prior action was filed promptly and long before the period expired.
218.

ld.

219.

In 1955, that section provided: "If an action is commenced within the time

at 408, 154 P.2d at 404.

reversed on appeal, the
plaintiff . . . may commence a new action within one year after the reversal." ld. at 409,
154 P;2d at 404 (emphasis added).

prescribed therefor, and a judgment therein for the plaintiff be

220. ld. , 154 P.2d at 405 .
221.
222.

ld. at 410, 154 P.2d at 405.
See generally, Simultaneous Litigation, supra note

applying equitable tolling to legal malpractice

107 (describing objections to

actions

and responses

objections).
223. 53 Cal. 3d 1072, 282 Cal. Rptr. 445, 811 P.2d 737 (Cal. 1991).
224. ld. at 1080, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 449-50, 811 P.2d at 741-42.

HeinOnline -- 26 Sw. U. L. Rev. 53 1996-1997

to these

54

SOUTHWESTERN UNWERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

for progressive property damage claims in Prudential, the Cali
fornia Supreme Court used the doctrine of equitable tolling to
hold that "this limitation period should be equitably tolled from
the time the insured files a timely notice, pursuant to policy no
tice provisions, to the time the insurer formally denies the claim
in writing. "225 In so holding, the court emphasized the policy
considerations in favor of the doctrine:
[T]he principle of equitable tolling presents several advantages in
eliminating the unfair results that often occur in progressive
property damage cases. First, it allows the claims process to func
tion effectively, instead of requiring the insured to file suit before
the claim has been investigated and determined by the insurer.
Next, it protects the reasonable expectations of the insured by
requiring the insurer to investigate the claim without later invok
ing a technical rule that often results in an unfair forfeiture of
policy benefits. . . . Third, a doctrine of equitable tolling will fur
ther our policy of encouraging settlement between insurers and
insureds, and will discourage unnecessary bad faith suits that are
often the only recourse for indemnity if the insurer denies cover
age after the limitation period has expired. . . . Equitable tolling
is also consistent with the policies underlying the claim and limi
tation periods - e.g. , the insurer is entitled to receive prompt
notice of a claim and the insured is penalized for waiting too long
after discovery to make a claim. For example, if an insured waits
11 months after discovering the loss to make his claim, he will
have only 1 month to file his action after the claim is denied
before it is time-barred under section 2071.226
Thus, in one opinion, the California Supreme Court re
solved four major problems concerning the applicability of the
statute of limitation for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. First, the court reaffirmed the principle
that contractual limitation provisions were valid and enforceable
'''as long as the limitation is not so unreasonable as to show im225. Prudential, 51 Cal. 3d at 678, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 389, 798 P.2d at 1232.
226. Id. at 692, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 398-99, 798 P.2d at 1241-42 (citations omitted).
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position or undue advantage. "'227 Second, it endorsed the hold
ing of Abari that the "rule that [the] one-year suit provision does
not apply to bad faith suits [is] inapplicable when the insured's
bad faith action is [a] 'transparent attempt to recovery on the
policy, notwithstanding his failure to commence suit within one
year of accrual."'228 Third, it held that "inception of the loss"
should be interpreted in accordance with the discovery rule of
accrual.229 Fourth, it held that the doctrine of equitable tolling
should be applied to toll the limitation period from the time the
insured files the claim until it is denied by the insurer?30 As one
subsequent court stated:
Significantly, Prudential's rules of flexible accrual and equitable
tolling will provide for policyholders under section 2071 much
the same disposition as did Frazier. Thus , an insured who makes
a timely claim will thereafter "ha[ve] a right (so far as the policy
limitation is concerned) to sit back and wait until denial of claim"
before the statute begins running again. But the statute still will
have commenced running, as its terms require, upon inception of
the loss (as defined in Prudential).231
IV .

CONCLUSION

The so-called "hybrid" nature of the cause of action for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was
227. Id. at 683, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 393, 798 P.2d at 1236 (quoting C & H Foods Co. v.
Hartford Ins. Co., 163 Cal. App. 3d 1055, 1064, 211 Cal. Rptr. 765, 769 (Ct. App. 1984» .
228. Id. at 692, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 398-99, 798 P.2d at 1241-42.
229. Id. at 678, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 389, 798 P.2d at 1232.
230. Id. at 678, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 389, 798 P.2d at 1232. In so hOlding, the court
observed that "[o]ne commentator has called it 'unconscionable' to permit the limita
tion period to run while the insured is pursuing its rights in the claims process," id. at
690, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 397, 798 P.2d at 1240 (citing 18A GEORGE J. CoUCH, CoUCH ON
INSURANCE § 75:88 (2d ed. 1983», thus connecting the tolling rationale to the modern
standard for assessing the validity of contractual limitation of suit provisions. See supra
notes 153-59 and accompanying text.
231. Prieto v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 225 Cal. App. 3d 1 188, 1196, 275 Cal.
Rptr. 362, 366 (Ct. App. 1990) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
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the product not only of overlapping legal theories of recovery
but also of attempts to extend or shorten the limitation period
within which claims for emotional distress and punitive damages
could be · brought. Now that the California Supreme Court has
firmly re-established the contractual nature of the implied cove
nant in non-insurance cases, the applicable limitation principles
are more clear. The limitation periods and rules of accrual that
apply to contract claims generally should govern the cause of ac
tion for breach of the implied covenant outside the insurance
context. For actions for breach of the implied covenant in insur
ance contracts, the doctrine of election of remedies applies only
in the absence or invalidity of contractual modification. The vast
majority of such actions are subject to contractual limitation-of
suit provisions, which are now governed by a new set of rules
incorporating the principles of discovery accrual and equitable
tolling. These principles should bring a measure of stability to
what has been a contentious and complicated question of statu
tory interpretation.

HeinOnline -- 26 Sw. U. L. Rev. 56 1996-1997

